Corporate Voters Project, Great Crime, Value of the Franchise

Don’t Let the Self-Parody Obscure the Disgrace of Delaware’s AI Companies

Or, Three Observations On the State’s Newest Immodest Proposal

Chicken Salesman: 
<Slaps Blue Hen>
<speaking to potential buyer>
"This baby can fit so much corrupt debasements of democracy in it..."


UPDATE: While I was writing this post, the draft legislation was ferreted out and made public by the good eggs at The Chancery Daily. You can find it at this link.

As I noted in a prior post, Delaware’s Secretary of State, Charuni Patibanda-Sanchez, recently announced that DE is creating and testing “a new entity form:” the “artificial intelligence company,” or “AIC.” She made this announcement in a paywalled Fortune commentary, co-authored with a deeply-invested CEO, John Nay of Norm AI. The SecState and the CEO’s essay advertises a simple concept, albeit one that – if we read it seriously as a policy program, and as a statement of values – is both corrupting and ridiculous.

According to the pair, a Delaware AIC will be a legal identity “wrap” for “autonomous” computing systems. They frame it as an “iteration of a corporate legal structure” – but not just the next step in entities, but a huge leap, the “most consequential” form of entity ever devised. An AIC will grant legal personhood to software, with all the civil and political rights that other legal entities like corporations, LLCs and trusts already provide: to have, hold, and dispose of property, incur obligations, sue and be sued in courts of law, fund to political campaigns, exercise protected free speech, vote in local elections, etc., etc., etc.

In return for providing the human founders and funders of a capital good with an immensely powerful political tool and a durable liability shield, Delaware will subject the AIC to temporary oversight, via “regulatory sandbox.” By this childish metaphor – borrowed from au courant tech-biz-bro lingo – the co-authors appear to mean such entities will be subject, at their chartering, to review by an un-elected committee of indeterminate government officials and indiscriminate “technologists.” In addition to this once-over, AICs will face some of the rules all other state-registered organizations already do: they will be required to keep business records (“a log of its activities”), and – like the solvent banks of yore – AICs will be required to be “adequately capitalized.” (What “adequately” might mean is left as an exercise to the reader).

This advance in corporate coverture is urgently needed, the SecState and CEO insist, because AI technology is moving so fast you guys.[1] With the singularity almost upon us – and since AI-controlled business entities are already legal, if not extant, per Nay – a new legal framework is required to keep “autonomous commerce” onshore and visible to American courts, or at least in sight of Delaware’s famously blinkered jurists.[2]

The Fortune piece is – literally – a company press release for Norm AI. In keeping with genre conventions, it’s light on substance, long on hype. But don’t let the format obscure things too much: the exercise – like the AIC concept itself – is fundamentally ridiculous. If we’re to take it seriously (and I’m afraid we must), it makes a mockery of the sovereign powers a democratic government should, or could, exercise: it debases any concept of deliberative process, by announcing a fait accompli and promises manufactured entities for sale, before any legislation has been passed, much less made public or debated; and it insults the idea of a government for the people, by the people, by pretending that the mass production of new capital creations is purely a matter of meeting market needs, an economic action only – as if that’s the only thing at stake in a state where capital literally gets a vote.  

It’s a bit like electing a dog to be mayor, but without any opportunity for a cute photo-op.

Duke the Dog Mayor, a Great Pyrennees wearing a top hat, serious look, and collar with the sign "mayor" on it. 

That's what Delaware looks like, but not cute, rn.
a good boy but no basis for a system of government

The honking clownishness of the proposal and its vagueness are both strategic choices, and should be read as such. The Secretary of State could have chosen to be more forthright, and less laughable: reliable journalists have reported that the proposed legislation exists, and even has a familiar attributed author. So it’s notable she chose to share real details only with potential out-of-state business partners, and not the grubby rabble of the Delaware citizenry.[3] In the First State, the groundlings might be the reason for the stage – hell, we might be the people who set it up – but the real show is for the the box seats only.

Credit where it’s due, as a marketing gimmick, the trick is working. The proposal has met with enthusiasm in all the usual quarters, and no serious criticism. (Though I do wonder if the AIC boosters appreciate their biggest fans comparing the “regulatory sandbox” to the infamous fences at Jurassic Park?). Still, there has been some light skepticism expressed in the business press – some commentators, outside the familiar retailers of manufactured consent, have noted that the whole plan has been proposed by the hungry foxes who aim to guard the hen house.

The AIC proposal is a joke, if a profoundly sick and anti-democratic one. But like all jokes in the time of Trump, it’s the kind of kidding-on-the-square that will have real consequences. So while I think it’s healthy, as good small-r republicans, to point and laugh at the officials of a state infamous for corporate corruption when they propose a new and shockingly more venal way of selling off citizens’ sovereignty, we must also <heavy sigh> take it seriously. 

So with that in mind, I want to offer three observations that zoom out from the proposal’s irritating gestures, and consider what this governance by blog post can tell us about the wider political economy of tech oligarchs acting through their favorite puppet, the State of Delaware. 

Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, Train Crash, Philadelphia (Pa.), n.d., b/w photograph, Temple University Libraries, Special Collections Research Center, accessed July 23, 2026, http://digital.library.temple.edu/cdm/ref/collection/p15037coll3/id/67183.
The State of Delaware’s Plan

First: What’s news in the Fortune piece is not the law-adjacent tech hype, but Delaware officials’ admission that they plan to start this “experiment” with government failure, via regulatory capture.

The key bit is the closing line of the fifth paragraph, where the co-authors declare that “[t]he framework for industry engagement with AICs is being developed in Delaware as part of a public-private partnership led by Norm Ai.”

The – surprising! – present tense suggests that the State has already contracted with Norm Ai to do the work (a FOIA opportunity, perhaps!). Norm Ai is a company that builds software to provide legal services, and, critically, seeks to build software that provides governments with regulatory supervision services. That means that Norm Ai CEO John Nay has found in Delaware the state partner he described as necessary to run the business experiment outlined in his 2023 Science article. Nay and Norm AI both need Delaware as a host body politic, to pay off their investment strat and to transmit the results of the experimental infection to the rest of the United States through the Full Faith and Credit clause (and more generally, through the legal concept of comity).

As Julian Lim notes in Startup Fortune, the timing is … unsubtle. Norm Ai finished its latest fundraising round – with investments from Blackstone, Vanguard, and Bain – just a week before the Fortune announcement. For a company that wants be “the compliance machinery” layer – that is, to run the the state-authorized oversight and governance, “[t]hat funding round fits the Delaware proposal almost too neatly.” I agree, and would add that it’s clear that Norm Ai has dictated terms to Delaware, not the other way around.

Announcing their willingness to be used by Norm Ai for the corporation’s business development also means that Delaware has decided to forgo developing state capacity – while (presumably) forking over a healthy chunk of public money for the privilege. (Say, wouldn’t a FOIA of that contract be useful?).

Now, a single vendor monopolizing a government in order to dictate its own contracts and make itself indispensable is not unusual (unfortunately). It’s a model that describes a lot of government services in the United States – but it’s a proven failure everywhere.

As journalist Annie Kim detailed in her book Poverty for Profit (and as many academics have studied), outsourcing government services is endemic in the neoliberal era. The pattern is readily apparent in welfare offices, tax services, prison management, healthcare, and education: by replacing government with corporate bureaucracy, a company is able to build expertise while controlling information, strangling the state’s ability to benefit from market competition among vendors, or even assess contract performance. Like all monopolies this results in much higher costs, worse service, and an enormous amount of abuse (financial, but also often bloodily physical).[4]

This is the system DE uses to provision prison healthcare and other government services, so it’s not surprising that it’s defaulted to it when seeking to create and govern a new legal regime. One might even come to the conclusion that Delaware’s officials don’t know better – or choose not to.

Still, it’s disappointing that the Meyer administration has gone straight to regulatory capture before they even begin administering these new entities. Fully automated oligarchic control over state government seems … well, less than ideal! At least if your ideal for who government should serve is “the people,” and “the people” means “human beings” – all shaky assumptions in Delaware.

Irwin Nash, A Sink, North and Central America--United States--Washington (state)--Yakima county, n.d., Photographs, Film negatives, Washington State Libraries Digital Collections, accessed July 23, 2026, http://content.libraries.wsu.edu/cdm/ref/collection/nash/id/5755.
an AIC, ready to wash away responsibility

Second: the novel part of “AICs” isn’t the AI,  it’s the way the entity wraps an old device – the accountability sink – in shiny new paper.

In his excellent 2024 book, The Unaccountability Machine, financial analyst and ex-regulator Dan Davies introduced the world to a wonderfully powerful explanatory concept, the “accountability sink.” Drawn from his close reading of early cybernetic theorists, an “accountability sink” is simply the part of an organizational design that removes any specific human being from the critical moment of decision-making, “thereby severing the connection that’s needed for the concept of accountability to make sense.” 

Davies’s book digs into a large number of examples of accountability sinks operating in the real world, in existing and historical real-world systems – including many business corporations. Because it is such a useful tool for those in authority (at whatever level) it has become ubiquitous. It can be as simple as the airline rule book that the gate agent points at, to deny you a re-booking; or as complex as the interlocking firms, regulators, and markets that created the mortgage-backed securities crisis we all got to know so well in 2008. If you look, you’ll see accountability sinks everywhere, in every endlessly looping phone menu, in each insurance claim denial; they dominate our present bureaucratic reality, globally.

AICs are accountability sinks. They create an information-killing gap using a new and still scarily shiny technology – one that many people already treat as a magic black box – and then wrap it in a shell company, to provide human owners and funders with extra insulation from decisions, and thus culpability. 

So an AIC will indeed be a powerful thing, but not for the reasons the co-authors claim. It’s not any novel capability for “autonomous commerce” – vending machines, trading algos, and health insurance company websites all already exist, and do just fine – but the new layers of obfuscation it provides. The AIC is a entity designed to kick sand over a trail of footprints, then stamp the dust down with a herd of horses and shovel on a fresh layer of hot asphalt; when it’s through, no trace of human responsibility will be left on a decision, and that’s by design.

Note that the Fortune co-authors would have us believe the reverse: they claim that an AIC would create a “defined target to which responsibility and damages can attach.” But that already exists! In law and reality, there is an attachment rooting AIs already, at least insofar as any law can make one real. It’s the warranty claims of the makers, the property claims of the owners, and job liabilities incurred by the operators of the AI who are the people responsible for it, in the same way that an aircraft’s manufacturer, owners, and operators are responsible for a jet. Making a jet with autopilot capabilities its own recursive legal entity would not make accidents less common, or disastrous, or allow victims to recover damages better. 

Saying a capital good, a machine, does not have accountability attached is marketing nonsense, pure and simple – another irresponsible jest.[5]

Delaware Reports vol 2 via Hathi Trust, Title page 
https://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101044480836?urlappend=%3Bseq=7%3Bownerid=27021597769092815-19
an early record of Delaware lawmakers putting property over people

Third: There is a deep resonance between the legal logic advocates for AICs have deployed, and the logic found in the historical law of slavery. They both use law to reconcile the irreconcilable, in order to profit property over people.

For the SecState and CEO, the problem for lawmakers, supposedly, is that “autonomous software” can make economic decisions by itself – but since the AI is definitionally not “a person” in the law (yet), the State needs to create a new kind of entity so responsibility can “attach” to the agent. The SecState or CEO don’t have sufficient evidence to establish AIs as autonomous persons in the manner they describe; that’s magical thinking, and unserious except insofar as the weight of oligarchs’ heavy investments has brought an airy farce to ground, scarring the earth as it lands.   

However, I will note that a great of pre-1865 American law was devoted to a similar problem. That is: who was responsible when a species of property created by state law – an enslaved human being – took action independent of the property owner, their enslaver? 

Antebellum American jurists, including Delaware’s, spent a huge amount of time trying to reconcile slavery’s morally repugnant but obvious untruths – that human beings, as people, could be rationally treated in law as form of unthinking property – because it profited the wealthy and powerful.[7] That they failed intellectually – and morally – did not mitigate the project’s success as a means of generating secure property values, and profit, at least for a few decades.

The AIC proposal strikes me as operating in a parallel fashion: trying to reconcile inverse but still obvious, morally repugnant untruths – that algorithms, as property, can be rationally treated in law as a thinking kind of person – and for the same reason, it profits the wealthy and powerful.[8]

Source: Jerry Joschko, Circus Clown, 1970s, b/w photograph, Ball State University Digital Media Repository, https://dmr.bsu.edu/digital/collection/JoschJerry/id/178.
the author, emotionally

I don’t have a witticism to end this essay.

AICs might be a joke, but the proposal to create them is a bitter one that reveals a real depravity among the corporate elite and Delaware officials. It would be a better world if Delaware’s government would – for once – take the responsibility of democracy seriously, and use the power delegated to it by the citizens of the state to preserve human dignity, rather than degrade it for some outsider’s fintech fancies.

We at least deserve a cute dog for mayor.

——

Header Image: A Google Gemini-modified version of “Slaps Chicken” meme, altered so that the chicken in question is colored blue, like Delaware’s famous hens. (NB: using a tool does not mean I endorse making that tool a legal person with rights. I don’t think my car should get to vote, either; frankly, Honda Civics Hybrids trend too close to eco-terrorism as it is).

Notes

[1] As I noted elsewhere, the AIC is rooted in Silicon Valley’s millenarian cult, TESCREAL, which imagines – indeed, hopes – for the end of humanity. Norm AI’s own marketing materials eagerly assume that AGI (artificial general intelligence) is mere moments away, and with it, the rise of a new, intelligent but non-human species – which they are hoping to control and monetize to sell as legal counsel and compliance officers.

[2] Their argument works only insofar as you buy the implicit premise, that there is no danger associated with the underlying technology or behavior. But consider what AI is best known for, currently: writing emails and code, yes, but also generating CSAMlying to co-workers, and encouraging the kinds of psychotic breaks with reality that end lives. Oh, and enabling mass death through the destruction of vital government agencies

So perhaps the logic of “the kids are always going to drink and drive – there’s nothing we can do to stop them – so they might as well drive drunk at home” should not guide official Delaware policy?  

[3] This is the same tried-and-true tactic that Delaware officials since the 1960s have used to move corporate legislation through state government: keep the details secret, claim an hostage-situation level of urgency regarding state revenues, and then rush a bill through the assembly to put out the house fire they started.

[4] Until this AI company announcement, Delaware’s failures in this regard were most visible in its disastrous prison healthcare system – where the state’s utter failure to engage in oversight means services are dictated by cruel corporate vendors, with immense, avoidable human suffering the consequence.

[5] As for novelty: as Nay noted in his 2023 Science article, US law already does not require human beings to sit on a board, have human owners, or human managers. In Delaware of course, being human isn’t necessary to vote, either. So an AIC isn’t new for not having humans.

Too, the provision that AICs have to “keep a log of its activities” is yawn-inducing. Artificial entities of all sorts are already required by law to keep business records (do they? well … sometimes). Shareholders’ right to consult those “books and records” – and sue for managements’ or directors’ missteps therein discovered – is part of what Delaware’s legislature has narrowed in recent oligarch-scrivened “reforms.” So why would those rules apply to AI, anew? 

There’s good reason to doubt an AI would keep any kind of accurate log, given the way the technology operates. Because it is built to flatter, and to calibrate output according to the best language game result, there is no permanence to what an AI decides, no central reference point; that’s part of the value! And naughty AIs overwriting their instructions and backfilling datasets like so many octopuses escaping their aquariums is rather a trope in news reports about the tech these days.

[6] The multi-state project to rationalize slave law was sparked by the persistent efforts of the enslaved and their allies to use the tools of their oppressors to make the contradictions of the slave system unsustainable. “Freedom suits,” and similar, were grit in the gears of Americans’ legalized inhumanity, even when they failed. (Or perhaps you’ve heard of Dred Scott v. Sanford? That one moved the needle…)

For a good example of this wrestling in the legal mind of a slaveholder in Delaware, see: John M. Clayton, Chief Justice, Delaware Superior Court, majority opinion, in “Isaac Tindal, n. vs Daniel Hudson (1838),” in Delaware Reports (Dover, DE: Printed by A.M. Schee, 1841), 2:442

Clayton’s opinion was in its own time (in)famous for stating baldly what Black residents of Delaware knew well, viz., that the state’s racist laws robbed nominally free African Americans of nearly all their civil rights, rendering their citizenship hollow, and little different than slave status as a lived experience.

As Clayton put it: “But the negro is not such a freeman as to extend protection; he is though nominally free, almost as helpless and dependent on the white race as the slave himself; he has few civil rights, being merely protected in his person and property by the law, and being allowed in some cases to give his evidence in a court of justice. He can hold no office of honor, trust or profit; cannot act as a juror or legislator, cannot make or execute laws. He cannot, therefore, in any sense extend to a slave the protection due from a master, having no voice in the making, altering, enforcing or executing the laws; and having himself constantly to resort to the protection of the whites.” 

[7] While slavery as a legal practice is (mostly) banned by the 13th amendment, slave law precedents still form the basis for all kinds of commercial, property, and indeed corporation law. Justin Simard’s Citing Slavery Project documents how foundational slave law is to modern jurisprudence, partly in an effort to get the legal system to acknowledge the scope of the problem, and correct it by moving away from citing slave cases. As far as I know Delaware’s jurists have not made any effort to detach themselves from slave law precedent, in any regard.

Delaware

An LLC Is Not a Corporation

Or, It’s Impossible to Appease Critics Making Bad Faith Arguments (So Stop Trying)

The Delaware business entity filing for AH Capital Management, L.L.C.

Below is the email I wrote my local representatives, in response to a recent announcement from a notable Delaware-registered business entity.

Dear Rep. Gorman and Sen. Sokola:

Greetings, I hope this finds you well. I wanted to bring a recent piece of news to your attention, as it bears on the General Assembly’s treatment of corporate law.

Last week, Silicon Valley venture capital firm Andreessen Horowitz announced it had “decided to move the state of incorporation of our primary business, AH Capital Management, from Delaware to Nevada.” In a blog post titled “We’re Leaving Delaware, And We Think You Should Consider Leaving Too,” the firm’s legal and policy leads listed a number of complaints about Delaware law that pertain specifically to how Delaware’s corporate code operates – that is, to how Delaware law affects corporations. (These complaints echo those made by outside supporters of SB21.)

Here’s the thing, though: Andreessen Horowitz (AH Capital Management) is not a Delaware corporation. It’s a Delaware LLC. 

As a limited liability company, it can’t “move” its incorporation anywhere; it doesn’t exist. More to the point, none of Andreessen Horowitz’s complaints about Delaware apply to their firm, or to any of the subsidiaries they have registered here as LLCs or Limited Partnerships (LPs), as a quick search of the DE Division of Corporation Business Entity Filing database will attest. This distinction is not a mere matter of synonyms, but one with material consequences for how a business operates. As legal scholars have observed, “An LLC By Any Other Name Is Still Not A Corporation.”

It seems unlikely that the leaders of the world’s wealthiest venture capital firm cannot distinguish between two basic types of business entity structure. It seems equally unlikely, then, that Andreessen Horowitz’s decision to leave Delaware is motivated by their stated reasons. Their critique, in other words, appears to be made in bad faith. 

As you and your colleagues contemplate further revisions to Delaware’s corporate law, I urge you to keep this evidence of deceptive arguments from Delaware’s critics in mind – whether they come from business owners, directly, or the locally influential legal advocates they employ

Sincerely,
your constituent,
DN

NB: most of the outlets reporting on this move – NYT, Bloomberg, Inc – reproduce Andreessen Horowitz’s statement without comment, and thus its errors.



Corporate Voters Project

Little Delaware, Gangrened with Envy

Or, Delaware Caught Heat for Playing the Sorcerer’s Apprentice, Even in 1899 

Corporate Voters Project – Research Note #2

Recently, there’s been a bit of controversy about amendments to Delaware’s General Corporation Law. Supporters pushing recent amendments have gotten quite hot under the collar in public print and in legislative debates, and have accused critics of (what is now the signed) law of threatening the state’s entire political economy with their unprecedented rudeness

Much like the recent revisions to state law themselves, these reactions to mild criticism are expressions of myopia. Criticism of the sort SB 313 attracted in 2024 – that it proceeded anti-democratically, that it harmed ordinary people, that it was motivated by a small set of special interests’, and would lead to abuse – were leveled at Delaware state legislators when the state’s corporate law first passed in 1899.

If anything, earlier observers of Delaware corporate law in the Gilded Age were far more blunt in their criticism than anyone in the 21st century has ever thought about being. To illustrate, lend your eyes to this brief article from the American Law Review, a legal journal based in St. Louis:  “Little Delaware Makes a Bid for the Organization of Trusts,” American Law Review 33, no. 3 (May-June 1899): 418–24.

Well-known to Delaware lawyers – and recently, at least one historian – the article takes the form of an unsigned “note,” one of a few dozen that appeared at the back section of every journal issue, after the treatises and articles, but before the listings of recent major court decisions. My assumption is that it is either written by the editors, Seymour D. Thomson and Leonard A. Jones, or one of their close associates – and either way expresses their editorial views. 

And my goodness, are the Am.L. Rev. editors unimpressed with Delaware trying to copy New Jersey’s loose corporate charter rules, much less their attempt to “improve” on them by giving corporations even more expansive powers. After some praise for Delaware’s old Democratic (and enslaving) political establishment (and some sharp elbows at the emerging state Republican party), the editors note that the curious feature of US federalism – that state sovereign powers are equal, and that states set corporate law – is what provides the temptation that Delaware has now given into:  

“The “sovereign” States of the American Union are equal: equal in the Senate, for little Delaware wields the same voting power there as does great New York. They are also equal in regard of the deviltry they can do – equal in regard of the injury they can inflict upon their sister States. It is as though a Klondike gold mine had been discovered in New Jersey, and all Delaware were on the rush to get there. In other words little Delaware, gangrened with envy at the spectacle of the truck-patchers, sand-duners, clam-diggers and mosquito-wafters of New Jersey getting all the money in the country into her coffers, – is determined to get her little tiny, sweet, round, baby hand into the grab-bag of sweet things before it is too late.” (p. 419)

And, the editors note, this law will be a jobs-employment program for Delaware politicians; they may need to even import labor:

“But with this exception; and herein the little great “State of Delaware” casts its little great anchor to the windward. Although ” any three persons may organize a corporation,” yet ” only one director need be a resident of Delaware.” And this ” one director'” is going to be paid for being a director, and don’t you forget it. If the rush to organize corporations and trusts under this new Delaware law is as great as under the New Jersey law, there will not be politicians enough in Delaware to serve as directors of corporations and trusts for all the other States of the Union, but professional directors will have to migrate to Delaware from other States, and their name will be Legion.” (p.420)

 
Delaware legislators’ grandiose proclamations about their new law’s global applicability seem to be particularly grating:  

” Nor will you be confined, in the conduct of your business, when so happily incorporated, to your drought-smitten and grasshopper-eaten prairies. “It,”  – that is to say you when you have turned yourselves into Delaware corporations – ” may conduct business anywhere in the world.” Certainly you may. Why not? The great State of Delaware says so, and is not that enough?” (p. 421)

Halfway through, the editors re-frame their note as addressing the great political enemies of the Big Corporations in this particular moment – the hardworking, Populist Party-supporting farmers of Kansas.  (This is for rhetorical effect; I doubt too many populists were reading this attorney-specialty journal). And in this section, the editors suggest that should these farmers try to use the state power they control, they’ll face a potent force – in law, if not actually in the military.

“If Kansas attempts, through its legislation, to interfere with the sovereign prerogatives of Delaware, Delaware will be there with its oyster-boat and clam-boat navy, and with its unterrified militia; and what then will Kansas do about it?” (p.423)  

And then finally, they note the alchemical aspects of Delaware’s new law. 

“Let us not forget, oh, toiling brothers of the Kansas deserts, one other feature of this congenial law: 6. “The liability of the stockholder is absolutely limited when the stock has once been issued for cash, property or services.” Brother, do you need to photograph this sentence by means of an X-ray? Can you not see through it? Is it not pellucid ? It says, ” issued for cash.” It does not say paid for in cash. Is it not ” issued for cash” when it is issued for the promise of cash? and is it not issued for property or services when it is issued for the promise of such commodities? And if the gold bugs, bond- holders and other octopi, should render it hard to redeem your promise to pay for your shares – even in chips and whetstones, – why should you so pay? You have launched your corporation; the sovereign laws of Delaware allow you to commence business before any “sum whatever was paid in; ” and who or what is going to stop you from continuing your business? Do you not see that here is a scheme to turn the world into a sudden millennium? And if you object that a millennium must consist of a thousand years and cannot be created in a day, the answer is that all things are possible with the sovereign State of Delaware. What were the dreams of the ancient alchemists to this? They at most could, by processes somewhat tedious and expensive, convert gross metal into gold. But, without any gross metal of any kind to work upon, not even silver at the ratio of 16 to 1, the sovereign State of Delaware stretches forth her wand over the prairies of Kansas and calls upon money to come, and it comes.” (p.424)

What the irritated attorneys have described here is the central magic of finance, generally, and corporate finance, in particular. With some law and a bit of market faith – and a willingness to grift – you can conjure something out of nothing, and profit.  Devolving sovereign power onto private parties who derive artificial persons, and then mortgage those “persons’ ” future cash flows for current income to actually do something (well, sometimes) – That’s Capitalism, Baby! If it feels like fraud, well, you probably don’t sit on the right corporate boards.

This is all to say that criticism of those would weave this kind of spell – and of Delaware legislators’ meddling in its magics, specifically – is nothing new in 2024. The First State’s legislators been catching heat for playing sorcerer’s apprentice, and carrying water for outside financial interests, for a very long time. Maybe they should get used to it? (Or, I dunno, change their ways?)


Note: for further discussions of this article, and critiques of Delaware law generally, see:  “Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of 1967,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 117, no. 6 (April 1969): 861–98, and Hal Weitzman, What’s the Matter with Delaware?: How the First State Has Favored the Rich, Powerful, and Criminal―and How It Costs Us All (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2022).

Corporate Voters Project, Delaware, Power At Play

Corporations are Voters, My Friends

Or, An Investigation Into Just How Deep Delaware’s Commitment to the Bit Goes

Corporate Voters Project – Research Note #1

In Delaware, corporations can vote. So can LLCs, partnerships, and trusts, provided they own real property within the municipality where the election is taking place. In “The Company State,” capital not only has a voice – it has the franchise. 

And I want to know why.  

~*~

I first learned about corporations’ access to the ballot when I moved to Newark, DE in the summer of 2018. In breaks between schlepping boxes to our rented house, I caught up on local news, and learned that the City of Newark had recently held a referenda to authorize infrastructure borrowing – bonds to pay for new parks, and better sewers. All the measures passed handily. But of the over 2,000 ballots cast, some 118 “came from non-residents and corporations” – including 31 votes made by one representative of a local real estate company

So just as I became a new, working citizen of Delaware, I discovered that my rights paled next to the those enjoyed by old, rentier capital.

Though the election raised many questions – as well as my blood pressure – in the busy season of a new semester on an unfamiliar campus, I let it lie as an oddity. In the wake of that bond election, there was enough concern expressed by other locals that the City Council petitioned the state legislature to revise its charter, to limit the franchise to human residents and human non-resident property owners “in accordance with the principle of ‘one person, one vote.’” The charter was successfully amended in 2019. [1] 

But “dead labour” in the form of company capital, wasn’t done enlivening Delaware’s politics. In late spring 2023, news broke that the leaders of Seaford, DE had got a charter revision bill of their own introduced. It was the mirror image of Newark’s reform. Seaford wanted to empower a property owner, “whether a natural person or an artificial entity,” to vote in all town elections. (It seems the unpopular town council in Seaford was eager to substitute property for people, as voters). Delaware Republicans, eager to claim fifteen minutes of public infamy for supporting corporations’ right to stuff the ballot, used parliamentary tactics to bring the legislature to a screeching halt until the bill passed in the House. It did – though the measure was later quietly smothered in a Senate committee, and never became law. [2]

Needled twice by the news, my interest – and my ire – was piqued. And if that’s not a reason for research, what is?

~*~

If there was anywhere in the United States you might expect to find a corporation voting, Delaware is it. A state that only recently reached the milestone of one million human residents, the self-proclaimed “Corporate Capital of the World” is home to over two million business entities, including two-thirds of the Fortune 500.  

Corporations and LLCs don’t come here for the beaches, though. They sink shallow roots into our clayey soils because the state government offers a uniquely “business-friendly” regime. In return for filing a simple registration form and paying some light taxes and fees, DE state officials ask few questions, and impose fewer regulations. When conflicts between companies arise, as they tend to in the hurly-burly world of modern business, Delaware’s uniquely commercially-oriented Court of Chancery offers speedy, jury-free resolutions. And if that service fails to satisfy, well, the Delaware legislature is ready to bend to meet the whims of capital with a flexibility an Olympic gymnast would envy.

While intentionally obscured from ordinary residents, “The Franchise,” so-called, is well understood by CEOs and corporate lawyers, as well as the state’s politicians and their lobbyist handlers. For multinational conglomerates, secretive shell companies, and mom & pop landlords alike, Delaware offers the best deal within U.S. territory for running your business cheaply, opaquely, and just “legally” enough. 

This frictionless pliability pays for Delaware’s government. In fiscal year 2023, for example, the various fees and taxes levied on nominally Delaware-domiciled corporations and business entities provided $2.9 billion in revenue – a fairly typical 46.4% of total state collections. Whether clued in or not, all Delawareans are complicit in these arrangements. Their tax burden is low, yet their roads remain well-paved – because the First State has decided to use its sovereign power to charge a light toll in return for  displacing the true costs of unchecked capitalism onto the rest of the nation, and the world. [3]

It’s a little gift, from our little state. 

~*~

Still, even in Delaware, the idea that a corporation can vote gives people pause. It sure as heck arrested my attention, and puzzled me. So as the furor of the 2023 Seaford bill died down, and with my new hometown’s recent bond vote in mind, I’ve spent the last month or so digging into the practice of corporate voting in Delaware. 

I’ve tried to keep my questions simple, obvious, and answerable:  

  • How widespread is corporate voting? Does it only happen in Delaware towns, or beyond? 
  • When did the practice take hold – and under what circumstances? Is corporate voting a relic of the state’s Jim Crow past, or a more recent disease of the body politic? 
  • And finally: why? Of all the ways to arbitrarily pervert the democratic process to favor the wealthy, why have Delawareans chosen this method? And how is the local “corporate franchise” connected to “The Franchise” – if it is at all? 

My research plan is similarly straightforward. I’ve completed the first step, a close examination of the current charters of all 57 municipalities incorporated in the state of Delaware.  

Some early findings:

  • 70% of DE municipalities (40 towns & cities) allow corporations and other “artificial entities” to vote in at least some circumstances, usually referenda on annexation and/or bonds; 
  • Three towns (Dagsboro, Fenwick Island, and Henlopen Acres) allow corporate voting in all circumstances
  • The local corporate franchise is premised on property ownership: the “entity” must own real property within municipal limits (or proposed municipal limits, for annexations); and generally companies exercise their voting rights through a representative with power of attorney;
  • Most towns that allow corporate voting limit it using a “one person / one entity” rule – but not all of them do;

There is also a pronounced geography to corporate voting rights in Delaware: it gets more common as you travel south. New Castle County only counts 3 municipalities that allow it; Kent Co. has 16; and Sussex Co., land of beaches, chicken farms, and confederate monuments, has a whopping 21.   

Since it quickly became apparent to me reading charters that property ownership is critical to local corporate voting rights, I also tallied how many Delaware towns enfranchise non-resident property owners, and found that:

  • 81% of DE municipalities (46 towns & cities) allow non-resident real property owners to vote in at least some circumstances (again, most commonly annexation and bond elections); 
  • However, fully 23% of them (13 towns & cities) allow non-residents to vote in all elections – and some even allow people who don’t reside within the municipality to govern, as members of the town council!

As with corporate voting, the enfranchisement of non-resident property owners is more common in Sussex (24 towns), than it is in Kent Co. (17 towns), with New Castle coming last in the number of municipalities that allow it (just 5 towns).

Now that I’ve gotten a sense of the current landscape of corporate and property-defined voting, my next task is to dig into the history of a handful of municipalities, using newspapers and legislative archives, to see if I can find out when – and perhaps why – this corporate citizenship first appeared. 

I have no doubt but that further unpleasant surprises await; but that’s history, in Delaware.


[1]: Charter of the City of Newark, Art. IV,  Sec. 407.2(5)82. Del. Laws., Ch 107

For coverage, see: Karl Baker, “Newark, Delaware, Where Some People Can Vote More than Once,” News Journal, July 5, 2018, https://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/2018/06/29/newark-delaware-where-some-people-can-vote-more-than-once/735314002/; Karl Baker, “Only Person with ‘Heartbeat,’ Not Companies, Should Vote in Newark Elections, Council Says,” News Journal, March 12, 2019, https://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/2019/03/12/latest-backlash-against-llc-voting-newark-sends-heartbeat-voting-standards-dover/3127235002/ ; Josh Shannon, “Newark Asks State to Eliminate LLC Voting Rights from City Charter,” Newark Post, March 13, 2019, https://www.newarkpostonline.com/news/newark-asks-state-to-eliminate-llc-voting-rights-from-city-charter/article_afc76923-c835-5c68-a61e-79fed13d80ca.html

[2] HS 1 for HB 121: “An Act to Amend the Charter of the City of Seaford Relating to the City’s Ability to Authorize Artificial Entities, Limited Liability Corporations’ Partnerships and Trusts to Vote in Municipal Elections Held in Seaford,” (April 20, 2023), https://legis.delaware.gov/BillDetail?LegislationId=130205.

For coverage, see: Meredith Newman, “Why This Delaware Town Wants Corporations to Vote in Its Local Elections,” News Journal, May 11, 2023, https://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/politics/2023/05/11/why-seaford-wants-corporations-to-vote-in-town-elections/70203037007/ ; Meredith Newman, “If Seaford Gets Its Way, These Corporations and LLCs Could Be Voting in the next Election,” News Journal, May 17, 2023, https://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/politics/2023/05/17/delaware-llcs-could-vote-in-seaford-elections-if-charter-passes/70224526007/; Meredith Newman, “House Gop Kills $1.4 Billion Bond Bill After Effort to Allow LLCs in Seaford to Vote Fails,” News Journal, June 29, 2023, https://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/politics/2023/06/29/delaware-house-republicans-bond-bill-not-passed/70368194007/ ; Meredith Newman, “House Democrats OK Seaford LLC Voting Charter, Leading GOP to Pass Spending Bills,” News Journal, June 30, 2023, https://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/politics/2023/06/30/delaware-legislature-bond-bill-grant-in-aid-house-democrats-ok-llc-voting-bill/70372196007/

[3]“State General Fund, Revenue by Category (FY 2022-FY 2024),” Delaware Fiscal Notebook: 2023 Edition (Delaware Department of Finance), Section 2, p. 32, https://finance.delaware.gov/financial-reports/delaware-fiscal-notebook/.

In my calculation of the revenues generated by “The Franchise,” I include the corporate income tax, the franchise tax, the LLC/LP tax, business entity fees, “unclaimed property” (aka escheatment, aka Delaware skimming off of unused gift cards), and the bank franchise tax. 

For more on this system see: Hal Weitzman, What’s the Matter with Delaware?: How the First State Has Favored the Rich, Powerful, and Criminal―and How It Costs Us All (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2022).