Corporate Voters Project, Great Crime, Value of the Franchise

Don’t Let the Self-Parody Obscure the Disgrace of Delaware’s AI Companies

Or, Three Observations On the State’s Newest Immodest Proposal

Chicken Salesman: 
<Slaps Blue Hen>
<speaking to potential buyer>
"This baby can fit so much corrupt debasements of democracy in it..."


UPDATE: While I was writing this post, the draft legislation was ferreted out and made public by the good eggs at The Chancery Daily. You can find it at this link.

As I noted in a prior post, Delaware’s Secretary of State, Charuni Patibanda-Sanchez, recently announced that DE is creating and testing “a new entity form:” the “artificial intelligence company,” or “AIC.” She made this announcement in a paywalled Fortune commentary, co-authored with a deeply-invested CEO, John Nay of Norm AI. The SecState and the CEO’s essay advertises a simple concept, albeit one that – if we read it seriously as a policy program, and as a statement of values – is both corrupting and ridiculous.

According to the pair, a Delaware AIC will be a legal identity “wrap” for “autonomous” computing systems. They frame it as an “iteration of a corporate legal structure” – but not just the next step in entities, but a huge leap, the “most consequential” form of entity ever devised. An AIC will grant legal personhood to software, with all the civil and political rights that other legal entities like corporations, LLCs and trusts already provide: to have, hold, and dispose of property, incur obligations, sue and be sued in courts of law, fund to political campaigns, exercise protected free speech, vote in local elections, etc., etc., etc.

In return for providing the human founders and funders of a capital good with an immensely powerful political tool and a durable liability shield, Delaware will subject the AIC to temporary oversight, via “regulatory sandbox.” By this childish metaphor – borrowed from au courant tech-biz-bro lingo – the co-authors appear to mean such entities will be subject, at their chartering, to review by an un-elected committee of indeterminate government officials and indiscriminate “technologists.” In addition to this once-over, AICs will face some of the rules all other state-registered organizations already do: they will be required to keep business records (“a log of its activities”), and – like the solvent banks of yore – AICs will be required to be “adequately capitalized.” (What “adequately” might mean is left as an exercise to the reader).

This advance in corporate coverture is urgently needed, the SecState and CEO insist, because AI technology is moving so fast you guys.[1] With the singularity almost upon us – and since AI-controlled business entities are already legal, if not extant, per Nay – a new legal framework is required to keep “autonomous commerce” onshore and visible to American courts, or at least in sight of Delaware’s famously blinkered jurists.[2]

The Fortune piece is – literally – a company press release for Norm AI. In keeping with genre conventions, it’s light on substance, long on hype. But don’t let the format obscure things too much: the exercise – like the AIC concept itself – is fundamentally ridiculous. If we’re to take it seriously (and I’m afraid we must), it makes a mockery of the sovereign powers a democratic government should, or could, exercise: it debases any concept of deliberative process, by announcing a fait accompli and promises manufactured entities for sale, before any legislation has been passed, much less made public or debated; and it insults the idea of a government for the people, by the people, by pretending that the mass production of new capital creations is purely a matter of meeting market needs, an economic action only – as if that’s the only thing at stake in a state where capital literally gets a vote.  

It’s a bit like electing a dog to be mayor, but without any opportunity for a cute photo-op.

Duke the Dog Mayor, a Great Pyrennees wearing a top hat, serious look, and collar with the sign "mayor" on it. 

That's what Delaware looks like, but not cute, rn.
a good boy but no basis for a system of government

The honking clownishness of the proposal and its vagueness are both strategic choices, and should be read as such. The Secretary of State could have chosen to be more forthright, and less laughable: reliable journalists have reported that the proposed legislation exists, and even has a familiar attributed author. So it’s notable she chose to share real details only with potential out-of-state business partners, and not the grubby rabble of the Delaware citizenry.[3] In the First State, the groundlings might be the reason for the stage – hell, we might be the people who set it up – but the real show is for the the box seats only.

Credit where it’s due, as a marketing gimmick, the trick is working. The proposal has met with enthusiasm in all the usual quarters, and no serious criticism. (Though I do wonder if the AIC boosters appreciate their biggest fans comparing the “regulatory sandbox” to the infamous fences at Jurassic Park?). Still, there has been some light skepticism expressed in the business press – some commentators, outside the familiar retailers of manufactured consent, have noted that the whole plan has been proposed by the hungry foxes who aim to guard the hen house.

The AIC proposal is a joke, if a profoundly sick and anti-democratic one. But like all jokes in the time of Trump, it’s the kind of kidding-on-the-square that will have real consequences. So while I think it’s healthy, as good small-r republicans, to point and laugh at the officials of a state infamous for corporate corruption when they propose a new and shockingly more venal way of selling off citizens’ sovereignty, we must also <heavy sigh> take it seriously. 

So with that in mind, I want to offer three observations that zoom out from the proposal’s irritating gestures, and consider what this governance by blog post can tell us about the wider political economy of tech oligarchs acting through their favorite puppet, the State of Delaware. 

Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, Train Crash, Philadelphia (Pa.), n.d., b/w photograph, Temple University Libraries, Special Collections Research Center, accessed July 23, 2026, http://digital.library.temple.edu/cdm/ref/collection/p15037coll3/id/67183.
The State of Delaware’s Plan

First: What’s news in the Fortune piece is not the law-adjacent tech hype, but Delaware officials’ admission that they plan to start this “experiment” with government failure, via regulatory capture.

The key bit is the closing line of the fifth paragraph, where the co-authors declare that “[t]he framework for industry engagement with AICs is being developed in Delaware as part of a public-private partnership led by Norm Ai.”

The – surprising! – present tense suggests that the State has already contracted with Norm Ai to do the work (a FOIA opportunity, perhaps!). Norm Ai is a company that builds software to provide legal services, and, critically, seeks to build software that provides governments with regulatory supervision services. That means that Norm Ai CEO John Nay has found in Delaware the state partner he described as necessary to run the business experiment outlined in his 2023 Science article. Nay and Norm AI both need Delaware as a host body politic, to pay off their investment strat and to transmit the results of the experimental infection to the rest of the United States through the Full Faith and Credit clause (and more generally, through the legal concept of comity).

As Julian Lim notes in Startup Fortune, the timing is … unsubtle. Norm Ai finished its latest fundraising round – with investments from Blackstone, Vanguard, and Bain – just a week before the Fortune announcement. For a company that wants be “the compliance machinery” layer – that is, to run the the state-authorized oversight and governance, “[t]hat funding round fits the Delaware proposal almost too neatly.” I agree, and would add that it’s clear that Norm Ai has dictated terms to Delaware, not the other way around.

Announcing their willingness to be used by Norm Ai for the corporation’s business development also means that Delaware has decided to forgo developing state capacity – while (presumably) forking over a healthy chunk of public money for the privilege. (Say, wouldn’t a FOIA of that contract be useful?).

Now, a single vendor monopolizing a government in order to dictate its own contracts and make itself indispensable is not unusual (unfortunately). It’s a model that describes a lot of government services in the United States – but it’s a proven failure everywhere.

As journalist Annie Kim detailed in her book Poverty for Profit (and as many academics have studied), outsourcing government services is endemic in the neoliberal era. The pattern is readily apparent in welfare offices, tax services, prison management, healthcare, and education: by replacing government with corporate bureaucracy, a company is able to build expertise while controlling information, strangling the state’s ability to benefit from market competition among vendors, or even assess contract performance. Like all monopolies this results in much higher costs, worse service, and an enormous amount of abuse (financial, but also often bloodily physical).[4]

This is the system DE uses to provision prison healthcare and other government services, so it’s not surprising that it’s defaulted to it when seeking to create and govern a new legal regime. One might even come to the conclusion that Delaware’s officials don’t know better – or choose not to.

Still, it’s disappointing that the Meyer administration has gone straight to regulatory capture before they even begin administering these new entities. Fully automated oligarchic control over state government seems … well, less than ideal! At least if your ideal for who government should serve is “the people,” and “the people” means “human beings” – all shaky assumptions in Delaware.

Irwin Nash, A Sink, North and Central America--United States--Washington (state)--Yakima county, n.d., Photographs, Film negatives, Washington State Libraries Digital Collections, accessed July 23, 2026, http://content.libraries.wsu.edu/cdm/ref/collection/nash/id/5755.
an AIC, ready to wash away responsibility

Second: the novel part of “AICs” isn’t the AI,  it’s the way the entity wraps an old device – the accountability sink – in shiny new paper.

In his excellent 2024 book, The Unaccountability Machine, financial analyst and ex-regulator Dan Davies introduced the world to a wonderfully powerful explanatory concept, the “accountability sink.” Drawn from his close reading of early cybernetic theorists, an “accountability sink” is simply the part of an organizational design that removes any specific human being from the critical moment of decision-making, “thereby severing the connection that’s needed for the concept of accountability to make sense.” 

Davies’s book digs into a large number of examples of accountability sinks operating in the real world, in existing and historical real-world systems – including many business corporations. Because it is such a useful tool for those in authority (at whatever level) it has become ubiquitous. It can be as simple as the airline rule book that the gate agent points at, to deny you a re-booking; or as complex as the interlocking firms, regulators, and markets that created the mortgage-backed securities crisis we all got to know so well in 2008. If you look, you’ll see accountability sinks everywhere, in every endlessly looping phone menu, in each insurance claim denial; they dominate our present bureaucratic reality, globally.

AICs are accountability sinks. They create an information-killing gap using a new and still scarily shiny technology – one that many people already treat as a magic black box – and then wrap it in a shell company, to provide human owners and funders with extra insulation from decisions, and thus culpability. 

So an AIC will indeed be a powerful thing, but not for the reasons the co-authors claim. It’s not any novel capability for “autonomous commerce” – vending machines, trading algos, and health insurance company websites all already exist, and do just fine – but the new layers of obfuscation it provides. The AIC is a entity designed to kick sand over a trail of footprints, then stamp the dust down with a herd of horses and shovel on a fresh layer of hot asphalt; when it’s through, no trace of human responsibility will be left on a decision, and that’s by design.

Note that the Fortune co-authors would have us believe the reverse: they claim that an AIC would create a “defined target to which responsibility and damages can attach.” But that already exists! In law and reality, there is an attachment rooting AIs already, at least insofar as any law can make one real. It’s the warranty claims of the makers, the property claims of the owners, and job liabilities incurred by the operators of the AI who are the people responsible for it, in the same way that an aircraft’s manufacturer, owners, and operators are responsible for a jet. Making a jet with autopilot capabilities its own recursive legal entity would not make accidents less common, or disastrous, or allow victims to recover damages better. 

Saying a capital good, a machine, does not have accountability attached is marketing nonsense, pure and simple – another irresponsible jest.[5]

Delaware Reports vol 2 via Hathi Trust, Title page 
https://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101044480836?urlappend=%3Bseq=7%3Bownerid=27021597769092815-19
an early record of Delaware lawmakers putting property over people

Third: There is a deep resonance between the legal logic advocates for AICs have deployed, and the logic found in the historical law of slavery. They both use law to reconcile the irreconcilable, in order to profit property over people.

For the SecState and CEO, the problem for lawmakers, supposedly, is that “autonomous software” can make economic decisions by itself – but since the AI is definitionally not “a person” in the law (yet), the State needs to create a new kind of entity so responsibility can “attach” to the agent. The SecState or CEO don’t have sufficient evidence to establish AIs as autonomous persons in the manner they describe; that’s magical thinking, and unserious except insofar as the weight of oligarchs’ heavy investments has brought an airy farce to ground, scarring the earth as it lands.   

However, I will note that a great of pre-1865 American law was devoted to a similar problem. That is: who was responsible when a species of property created by state law – an enslaved human being – took action independent of the property owner, their enslaver? 

Antebellum American jurists, including Delaware’s, spent a huge amount of time trying to reconcile slavery’s morally repugnant but obvious untruths – that human beings, as people, could be rationally treated in law as form of unthinking property – because it profited the wealthy and powerful.[7] That they failed intellectually – and morally – did not mitigate the project’s success as a means of generating secure property values, and profit, at least for a few decades.

The AIC proposal strikes me as operating in a parallel fashion: trying to reconcile inverse but still obvious, morally repugnant untruths – that algorithms, as property, can be rationally treated in law as a thinking kind of person – and for the same reason, it profits the wealthy and powerful.[8]

Source: Jerry Joschko, Circus Clown, 1970s, b/w photograph, Ball State University Digital Media Repository, https://dmr.bsu.edu/digital/collection/JoschJerry/id/178.
the author, emotionally

I don’t have a witticism to end this essay.

AICs might be a joke, but the proposal to create them is a bitter one that reveals a real depravity among the corporate elite and Delaware officials. It would be a better world if Delaware’s government would – for once – take the responsibility of democracy seriously, and use the power delegated to it by the citizens of the state to preserve human dignity, rather than degrade it for some outsider’s fintech fancies.

We at least deserve a cute dog for mayor.

——

Header Image: A Google Gemini-modified version of “Slaps Chicken” meme, altered so that the chicken in question is colored blue, like Delaware’s famous hens. (NB: using a tool does not mean I endorse making that tool a legal person with rights. I don’t think my car should get to vote, either; frankly, Honda Civics Hybrids trend too close to eco-terrorism as it is).

Notes

[1] As I noted elsewhere, the AIC is rooted in Silicon Valley’s millenarian cult, TESCREAL, which imagines – indeed, hopes – for the end of humanity. Norm AI’s own marketing materials eagerly assume that AGI (artificial general intelligence) is mere moments away, and with it, the rise of a new, intelligent but non-human species – which they are hoping to control and monetize to sell as legal counsel and compliance officers.

[2] Their argument works only insofar as you buy the implicit premise, that there is no danger associated with the underlying technology or behavior. But consider what AI is best known for, currently: writing emails and code, yes, but also generating CSAMlying to co-workers, and encouraging the kinds of psychotic breaks with reality that end lives. Oh, and enabling mass death through the destruction of vital government agencies

So perhaps the logic of “the kids are always going to drink and drive – there’s nothing we can do to stop them – so they might as well drive drunk at home” should not guide official Delaware policy?  

[3] This is the same tried-and-true tactic that Delaware officials since the 1960s have used to move corporate legislation through state government: keep the details secret, claim an hostage-situation level of urgency regarding state revenues, and then rush a bill through the assembly to put out the house fire they started.

[4] Until this AI company announcement, Delaware’s failures in this regard were most visible in its disastrous prison healthcare system – where the state’s utter failure to engage in oversight means services are dictated by cruel corporate vendors, with immense, avoidable human suffering the consequence.

[5] As for novelty: as Nay noted in his 2023 Science article, US law already does not require human beings to sit on a board, have human owners, or human managers. In Delaware of course, being human isn’t necessary to vote, either. So an AIC isn’t new for not having humans.

Too, the provision that AICs have to “keep a log of its activities” is yawn-inducing. Artificial entities of all sorts are already required by law to keep business records (do they? well … sometimes). Shareholders’ right to consult those “books and records” – and sue for managements’ or directors’ missteps therein discovered – is part of what Delaware’s legislature has narrowed in recent oligarch-scrivened “reforms.” So why would those rules apply to AI, anew? 

There’s good reason to doubt an AI would keep any kind of accurate log, given the way the technology operates. Because it is built to flatter, and to calibrate output according to the best language game result, there is no permanence to what an AI decides, no central reference point; that’s part of the value! And naughty AIs overwriting their instructions and backfilling datasets like so many octopuses escaping their aquariums is rather a trope in news reports about the tech these days.

[6] The multi-state project to rationalize slave law was sparked by the persistent efforts of the enslaved and their allies to use the tools of their oppressors to make the contradictions of the slave system unsustainable. “Freedom suits,” and similar, were grit in the gears of Americans’ legalized inhumanity, even when they failed. (Or perhaps you’ve heard of Dred Scott v. Sanford? That one moved the needle…)

For a good example of this wrestling in the legal mind of a slaveholder in Delaware, see: John M. Clayton, Chief Justice, Delaware Superior Court, majority opinion, in “Isaac Tindal, n. vs Daniel Hudson (1838),” in Delaware Reports (Dover, DE: Printed by A.M. Schee, 1841), 2:442

Clayton’s opinion was in its own time (in)famous for stating baldly what Black residents of Delaware knew well, viz., that the state’s racist laws robbed nominally free African Americans of nearly all their civil rights, rendering their citizenship hollow, and little different than slave status as a lived experience.

As Clayton put it: “But the negro is not such a freeman as to extend protection; he is though nominally free, almost as helpless and dependent on the white race as the slave himself; he has few civil rights, being merely protected in his person and property by the law, and being allowed in some cases to give his evidence in a court of justice. He can hold no office of honor, trust or profit; cannot act as a juror or legislator, cannot make or execute laws. He cannot, therefore, in any sense extend to a slave the protection due from a master, having no voice in the making, altering, enforcing or executing the laws; and having himself constantly to resort to the protection of the whites.” 

[7] While slavery as a legal practice is (mostly) banned by the 13th amendment, slave law precedents still form the basis for all kinds of commercial, property, and indeed corporation law. Justin Simard’s Citing Slavery Project documents how foundational slave law is to modern jurisprudence, partly in an effort to get the legal system to acknowledge the scope of the problem, and correct it by moving away from citing slave cases. As far as I know Delaware’s jurists have not made any effort to detach themselves from slave law precedent, in any regard.

In an AI generated image (Gemini), a mainframe computer opens it's mouth and expels wires and cables, with sound waves moving out of its mouth. White background, black lines, like an editorial newspaper cartoon. It's not subtle.
Corporate Voters Project, Delaware

Saying the Quiet Part Out Loud, Now

Or, The Oligarchy’s Apologia

Corporate Voters Project – Research Note #8

In an AI generated image (Gemini), a mainframe computer opens it's mouth and expels wires and cables, with sound waves moving out of its mouth. White background, black lines, like an editorial newspaper cartoon. 

It's not subtle.

It’s been a busy few months for corporate voting in Delaware. As late spring turned to summer heat, the practice emerged as a politically salient issue, attracting local, state, and national attention. In both the courtroom and Legislative Hall, Delawareans have been articulating their positions on it – doing so publicly for perhaps for the first time in the state’s history. 

In the process, supporters of corporate voting have outlined a clear theory of local oligarchy. In this vision, the ownership of taxable real estate justifies rights to formal electoral power – and perhaps especially so if the property owner in question is a non-human business entity who cannot otherwise act locally (while thinking globally). 

In a moment when rights claims based on residence and birthright are under sustained attack by fascists and their allies, Delaware’s defenders of corporate voting have reinvigorated an old idea for a new era. Like early modern republicans, they envision a world in which ownership of taxable property produces and justifies citizenship – at least at the level of government closest to the ground. Unlike their predecessors, though, Delaware’s apologists for corporate voting imagine artificial entities, the law’s golems, as equally worthy bearers of a municipality’s political rights as any flesh and blood burgher might be. Jus soli might be hanging on by a single SCOTUS vote – the plain text of the Fourteenth Amendment be damned – but for some in the First State, legitimate voting power springs from owning the soil, for human and entity alike.

For their part, opponents of corporate voting have not questioned the importance of property to power, but only averred that human beings, alone and individually, should access the ballot. They’ve avoided the question of whether wealth itself is sufficient justification for suffrage, and dodged bigger problem of non-resident (human) property-owner voting, which is widespread and popular in Delaware, and not entirely unheard of beyond the state. There are limits to Delaware’s institutional advocates for human-centered democracy.

This debate marks a new phase in Delaware’s self-understanding about the foundations of its local political economies, one in which the parties engaged in the contest, and the values at stake, are finally named. Too, with this controversy, the connections between the capillary oligarchy of local government and the better-known corporate domination of the state’s politics have emerged from obscurity – or perhaps they’ve been forged for the first time. 

It’s an exciting time to be doing frustratingly difficult historical research!

~ ~ ~

A lawsuit kicked off Delaware’s unprecedentedly public debate over corporate voting. In December 2025, the ACLU of Delaware sued the Town of Fenwick Island over the municipality’s practice of awarding votes to the “corporations, partnerships, trusts, and limited liability companies” that owned property there. The ACLU-DE argued that by allowing 214 non-human artificial entities to registered to vote – with no limit on more – the town “risks the dilution of votes cast by natural persons” and therefore was in violation of the Delaware Constitution’s guarantee of “free and equal” elections.

The ACLU-DE also tied corporate voting to the state’s better-known corporate franchise, and its status as the “Corporate Capital.” In a press release, the plaintiff’s attorney, Andrew Bernstein, noted that “[t]here are over 2 million artificial business entities incorporated in Delaware and only about 1 million people,” and in those circumstances “the people of Delaware risk having their voices drowned out when towns like Fenwick Island allow artificial entities to vote.”

In response to the suit, Fenwick Island Mayor Natalie Magdeburger offered a robust defense at a Town Council meeting. She insisted, pace the ACLU-DE’s insinuations of corporate influence, that “a great number of the artificial entities that vote in Fenwick Island elections are family trusts,” not corporations per se. But regardless of the type of artificial entity, she said the Town would defend their rights to political representation. “We think it’s important that everyone in town who pays taxes, who is subject to our ordinances whether they’re a business owner or not, have a right to a vote.” An entity’s compulsory monetary contributions to the local fisc, made on the basis of assessed real estate, was, in her view, the entry ticket to town government. 

On May 26, 2026, Delaware Superior Court Judge Craig A. Karsnitz sided with Fenwick’s officials, and dismissed the ACLU-DE’s complaint. In his opinion, Karsnitz developed what appears to be a wholly new legal interpretation to justify corporate voting, becoming the first to “clearly articulate the ideological connection between Delaware’s ‘corporate franchise’ and its enfranchised corporations.

Perhaps fitting the unusual circumstances, Judge Karsnitz’s opinion was a curious one. After some throat-clearing featuring a wandering quotation from an obscure Luso-Luxembourger teacher of English, Judge Karsnitz explained his dismissal did not rest on any detailed scrutiny of newly-gathered facts.[1] Reasoning that because the Delaware General Assembly’s laws are presumed constitutional,  challenges to Fenwick’s charter must meet a high burden to merit review – a burden he argued the ACLU-DE failed to meet, not least because the state did not just extend voting rights to corporations once, but several times, in different municipalities.[2] Then, going well beyond election law and constitutional provisions, Karsnitz argued that because the State of Delaware’s business law explicitly recognizes trusts, partnerships, LLCs, and corporations as “persons” in limited circumstances, their votes cannot be considered as diluting other persons’ votes.[3]  He concluded by stating that while he “appreciate[s] that Plaintiff may disagree with Delaware’s policy of authorizing” corporate voting, the vision of “faceless large corporations or even HAL, controlling a small town” are “the stuff of science fiction” – and not a suitably adjudicable problem.[4] 

SIDEBAR: A few days after Judge Karsnitz invoked the prospect of an autonomous computer taking control of a polity to dismiss it, the Delaware AI Commission met to announce their draft legislation that would suspend regulations to allow the creation of Artificial Intelligence Companies. These “AICs,” members of the commission explained, would have legal agency to do “anything that a company can do” without their owners being held liable.

Including, presumably, vote as property-owners in Fenwick Island.


(Judges, at all levels, seem unwilling to contemplate just how eager Delaware is to create and implement the Torment Nexus, provided there are fees to collect.)

The ACLU-DE has appealed the dismissal. In their press release following the decision, they noted that the judge’s ruling has “garned national attention” – one might also say outrage and bewilderment – and that many people had expressed concern about the precedent it would set. Responding to the ruling, Fenwick Island Mayor Natalie Magdeburger reiterated the Town’s position, and expanded her emphasis on the righteousness of the cause, stating that “[w]e firmly believe our voting system is just, fair and gives everyone a voice.” Every property owner paying taxes “should have a say in who represents them on our Town Council,” she explained. In the political arithmetic of corporate voting, property taxation to any amount is a moral liability that can only be balanced by representation, an asset that takes the form of one vote per entity.

~ ~ ~

While this courtroom drama was playing out, the Delaware General Assembly was considering – and then passing – HB 430, legislation that would amend the state constitution to restrict voting in all Delaware elections to “natural persons,” and thereby end corporate voting. (Constitutional amendments in Delaware are enacted if they pass both houses of the legislature with a two thirds majority, in two successive sessions. The earliest this bill could become law is when the legislature meets next spring 2027).

According to its sponsor, House Majority Leader Rep. Kerri Evelyn Harris (D-Dover), the bill is not about “how municipalities govern themselves” but rather “who gets to decide who gets to choose their governments in the first place.” For Harris and the other cosponsors of the bill (all Democrats), “voting is a right that belongs to human beings,” not corporations. Anticipating pushback from local officials, Harris further noted that the state had undisputed power to issue these restrictions. The General Assembly, she informed a House committee, has never treated municipalities as “independent sovereigns”; their powers are defined by the charters that the state grants them. (Historically, state and federal governments share sovereign powers in the US; localities have no constitutional claims to “home rule.”)

HB 430 passed the Delaware House of Representatives on June 16, 2026 with the required two-thirds majority. The vote was bipartisan, but just: only one GOP representative voted for it. Though the Republican caucus opposed it, only one member spoke against the bill. Rep. Bryan Shupe (R-Milford) sought to put on the record that he and other “small business owners” who used LLCs were responsible, as human beings, for paying taxes, and that is why some municipalities have allowed – and still others seek to allow – “small business owners” to vote in municipal elections. For Shupe, voting rights in exchange for payments was simply a fair transaction, hallowed by long use. In response, Rep. Harris noted that tradition was no defense: “just because something is a longstanding practice does not mean that it should continue.”[5]

In these and later comments, Rep. Shupe attempted to draw a distinction between large corporations and mom-and-pop LLCs, while still leaving unexplained the justification for property earning a vote. “We don’t necessarily want the Fortune 500 having a say in elections here,” he told the Wilmington News Journal, “but homegrown businesses should.” (Why that should be the case, he left unstated).

Similarly, the mayor of Fenwick Island declared the HB 430 vote “a shame” and a “glaring example of the erosion of home rule.” “The ACLU has come in and painted Fenwick Island as a town that has been taken over by corporate entities,” Mayor Magdeburger told Coastal Point, but most of the artificial entities registered to vote in Fenwick were trusts, LLCs, or limited partnerships. While maintaining that critics concerns that “businesses are going to take over and dilute the vote” were unfounded, the mayor also complained that if made law, HB 430 would disenfranchise around 200 of the Town’s 900 registered voters (i.e. ~22% of the electorate).  

On the last day of the legislative session, HB 430 passed the Senate on a strict party-line vote, with all Democrats voting in favor and all Republicans against, completing the first “leg” of the constitutional amendment process. Reportedly, Sen. Gerald Hocker, GOP minority leader – and the legislative sponsor of Fenwick’s 2008 charter that established the present regime – “vocally opposed” the bill.

~ ~ ~

Corporate voting in Delaware is not the creation of world-dominanting oligarchs, nor is it a tool they use. Amazon.com, Inc. is not going to spoil the race for town council in Middletown by voting its warehouse holdings; JPMorgan Chase & Co. is unlikely to cast the deciding ballot for a beach-town mayor on the basis of repossessed mortgages. Rather, corporate voting in Delaware is a vehicle for granting those lesser grandees who own property – specifically, taxable real estate – extra political power because of their local, landed wealth. 

As Rep. Shupe’s comments and Mayor Magdeburger’s statements make clear, for defenders of corporate voting in Delaware, there are distinctions to be drawn among artificial entities, but no disagreement over whether property creates citizenship rights for fictional people. In the courtroom, in the legislature, and in the public square, apologists for corporate voting imply that corporations are somehow different than other kinds of business entities – they are distant, faceless, perhaps malevolent – in contrast to LLCs, trusts, and limited partnerships. 

This difference has little relationship to reality. While legally these entities are distinct in their governance and their means of assigning tax responsibilities, those structural differences do not determine their proximity to a human community or their degree of similarity to “natural persons.” An LLC can be a huge, opaque, and far-away abstraction, and a corporation can be a one-person operation familiar and friendly to all on Main Street. Neither of them are human beings.

It’s important to note here that Delaware’s critics of corporate voting have not attacked the practice of granting civil and political rights to individual human beings purely on the basis of their personal property ownership. The objection of HB 430’s sponsors and the ACLU-DE is to the type of person – artificial or natural – submitting a ballot, not the basis upon which they do so. 

That’s notable because corporate voting is just one way for property-owning nonresidents to exercise control over places where they do not live. This may be part of the reason why it is so common in Sussex County, an area with valuable beach front property – owned, in many cases, by absentees, members of the “family trusts” that Fenwick’s mayor has been fond of invoking (with emphasis on “family”).  

In granting property owners more power than mere mortal persons, corporate voting echoes anti-democratic mechanisms from earlier eras of American history. Like the U.S. Constitution’s 3/5ths clause (granting enslavers more representation on the basis of their human property) or Jim Crow Delaware’s poll taxes (which limited the vote to taxpayers, stealing suffrage from the poor), corporate voting is yet one more way those with more money get a louder voice in public affairs. 

Whether artificial entities get to keep that register for their influence is an open question now in a way it was not before, a salutary development for all fans of democracy. Still, that landed wealth remains unquestioned as a source of citizenship, even amid this change – and perhaps may emerge stronger as a unifying principle across parties and activist groups – should raise some red flags. 

—–

[1] This may be a confession of my own ignorance; until reading Judge Karsnitz’s order, I had never encountered “Diogo Joao Baptista Gomes of Brachtenbach,” someone who appears to have responded to a reader poll sponsored by Philosophy Now magazine. While those more learnèd in the law may know his work well, it appears there is at least one other observer puzzled by the Superior Court judge’s compliment“What Is a Person?,”Philosophy Now, April/May 2022.

[2] Worthy magistrate Karsnitz only mentions the 2008 Fenwick charter in his decision. Am. Civ. Lib. Union of Del. v. Town of Fenwick Island, Del. Super., C.A. No. S25C-12-003, Karsnitz, R.J. (May 26, 2026)(ORDER), p.6; see pp. 8-12 for wider consideration on charters. 

Wise and worldly readers will know that corporate voting came to Fenwick in a limited way through its 1965 charter revision – and then was expanded in practice, first under unpublished bylaws and only later legislatively blessed by formal charter amendments.  

[3] Am. Civ. Lib. Union of Del. v. Town of Fenwick Island, Del. Super., C.A. No. S25C-12-003, Karsnitz, R.J. (May 26, 2026)(ORDER), pp. 13-17.

[4] If you’re wondering if this sober jurist used the opportunity of his own dated reference to insert a superfluous citation to a famous film, why yes, yes he did. Am. Civ. Lib. Union of Del. v. Town of Fenwick Island, Del. Super., C.A. No. S25C-12-003, Karsnitz, R.J. (May 26, 2026)(ORDER), p. 19

[5] Delaware House of Representatives, 153rd General Assembly, Legislative Session 2, 36th Legislative Day, June 16, 2026, 7:29pm-7:39pm.

Corporate Voters Project, Delaware

Forever the Fenwick Island Corporation 

Or, Shady Sovereignty at the Sands Motel 

Corporate Voters Project – Research Note #7 

A postcard featuring the Sands Motel in Fenwick Island, DE. Three images: one is a view of the exterior of the hotel and its parking lot; a blue and white building with cars parked outside. A smaller insert features white people in bathing suits at the beach; and a third white people at the motel pool, with the logo and building behind them. Source: Sands Beach Resort Motel, 1979, Postcard, 21 x 9 cm, Special Collections, University of Delaware Library, GRA 0138, Delaware Postcard Collection, https://digitalcollections.udel.edu/Documents/Detail/sands-beach-resort-motel/164590.

Fenwick Island, as a modern community, was born a Delaware chartered corporation – which perhaps explains the municipality’s current attachment to corporate voting. 

Today, the Town of Fenwick Island is (in)famous for being among the handful of Delaware municipalities that allows corporations to vote in local elections.[1] Like other towns that enfranchise fictional persons, Fenwick awards voting rights on the basis of residency and property ownership. The tiny beach settlement (year round pop. < 400) does put some limits on the corporate vote: since 2008, Fenwick’s charter has insisted on a “one-person/entity, one vote” principle, so property owners cannot double dip, voting as both individuals and as the entities they control; nor can they vote multiple times based on the number of parcels they (or the entity) own.[2] 

Still, the political community that defines this narrow spit of land is firmly committed to oligarchy. Not only are non-resident property owners enfranchised, they can – and frequently do – make up a majority of the town council: only three of its seven members have to be full-time human residents.[3]

Recently, Fenwick was in the news for more than its generic lighthouse. In December 2025, the ACLU Delaware sued Fenwick in state court for violating the Delaware Constitution’s guarantee of “free and equal” elections conducted on the principle of “one person, one vote.” [4] The case is pending, though Fenwick Mayor Natalie Magdeburger told a reporter that it is “[o]ur belief is that everyone who pays taxes and is subject to our ordinances should have a vote” – including within “everyone,” the artificial entities commonly used to manage property. [5]

But how did this one-lane sea shore village become a rentiers’ redoubt? And when did it decide to shift from human rule to government for and by artificial entities? The legal history of this sandy spit on the Mason-Dixon line reveals the surprisingly recent roots of corporate voting, as an active practice – but also Delaware’s long tradition of privileging property over people. 

~~~

Fenwick Island began its life as a distinct Delawarean community as an insider real estate speculation. In 1893, John H. Layton, Clerk of the Delaware House, bought out the owners of the barrier island that overlapped the Delaware-Maryland border, commonly known, if vaguely, as “Fenwick Island.”[6] Layton appears to have been the front man for a consortium of moneyed Delaware speculators, including legislators and industrialists, who quickly won two corporate charters to develop and manage the property.

The first, the Fenwick Island Company, was a real estate firm dedicated to managing “the business of purchasing, selling, holding, improving and managing real estate and island property.” The state granted it a $50,000 capitalization, extendable to $300,000, and the right to construct a railroad. (NB: unlike corporations under current Delaware law, the Fenwick Island Company’s founding document guaranteed shareholders’ democratic governance rights: all bylaws had to be decided by stockholders, and at all stockholder meetings, “all questions shall be decided by decided by a majority of votes case…each share of stock being entitled to one vote.” No question about rights to make proposals then, though later corporate advocates committing acts of law office history have offered alternate facts.)

The second was the Fenwick Island Gunning Club. Though Fenwick’s dunes and marshes were reportedly good territory for goose and duck shoots, its charter was silent on “gunning” (hunting) – but it did declare the corporation’s purpose as to provide for the “social intercourse and mutual improvement of its members.” (It’s founding members were the same as the real estate company.) [7]

Despite Layton’s string-pulling in Dover to acquire land and investment vehicles, not much came of the effort. Fenwick land sales didn’t boom, and neither a hunting resort nor a railroad was built. But in the decades following,  Fenwick Island did become something of a cheap vacation spot, the site of regular evangelical camp-meetings, where vactioners enjoyed shore stays in rustic lean-tos and squat cottages [8]. After the state built a new road in the 1930s, cottagers petitioned for the right to purchase titles to the lots they leased – which they gained in 1942, after a legal battle over property rights between the state and the various “real estate men” resolved in the state’s favor.[9]

~~~

By 1953, the growth of Ocean City, Maryland next door, and the advent of better roads and more secure land titles, appears to have made Fenwick popular enough to lead property owners to petition the General Assembly for a charter, which duly passed into law without attracting comment. As with the corporation that preceded it, the town was to be run for and by property. Its government, a town council, was a body whose membership could only be composed of freeholders; those town councilors would be voted in by an electorate composed of “male or female” persons, twenty-one or over, who qualified for the franchise by being “freeholders,” either themselves or by marriage. Notably, while the original Fenwick Island town charter explicitly recognized that persons, partnerships, and corporations could be assessed taxes, implicitly it reserved voting rights for “persons” with qualities of gender and age – that is, human beings. [10]  

Unusually for Delaware municipalities, the Town of Fenwick Island has never revised its charter wholesale, but only amended it  – making it more difficult to track when corporate voting arose. The first evidence of the practice in state law appears in 1965, when the town charter was amended to allow the authorities to issue infastructure bonds. As with other municipalities, this new capacity for extending municipal credit came with new oversight: special hearings to propose and discuss the borrowing, and a special election to obtain voters’ approval. These special bond elections expanded the electorate to corporations, explicitly, and tilted power toward wealth: “every owner of property, whether individual, partnership or corporation” could vote, and they “shall have one vote for every dollar” paid in tax. Voting could be in person “or by proxy.” In other words: a few months before the US Congress would pass the Voting Rights Act to ensure all Americans could participate in elections equally, the Town of Fenwick Island in still-segregated Delaware extended new voting rights only to propertied fictional persons. [11]

Universal human suffrage did not reach Fenwick Island until after man had visited the moon and disco conquered the dance floor. In 1979, a charter amendment lowered the voting age to eighteen, and specified that all humans residents in town on election day were “entitled to vote.”[12]

This new regime was not without its complications, however. In 1981, Fenwick’s police chief, James L. Cartwright, was disqualified as a candidate for a town council race because he did not own a sufficiently decisive property interest. A non-resident, Cartwright had thought himself qualified, because he owned a minority stake in a corporation that owned real estate in town: 20/400 shares in the Sussex Sands Inc., a corporation that owned and operated the Sands Motel. Citing an unpublished “municipal policy” that granted only majority stockholders of property-owning corporations the right to run for office, the town council rejected Cartwright’s bid for candidacy – and he found a lawyer to contest the rejection. His attorney, Robert C. Wolhar, discovered that “at least three of the current councilmen” in Fenwick were similarly deficient – owning only a minority share of the same motel corporation. A town council thusly improperly constituted, Wolhar alleged, could not govern legally, and thus “all the ordinances and police arrests made in the small seaside town may be illegal because some of the commissioners … were seated illegally.” [13] 

The Delaware Department of Justice, following its characteristic approach to white collar law enforcement, declined to pursue the matter. The next Fenwick election – with a high turnout of 400 – swept in a slate of fully qualified candidates, seemingly resolving the immediate issue.[14] Following this dispute, Fenwick amended it’s charter several times in the early 1980s, using increasingly convoluted language to define qualifications for voters and candidates for office. In 1986, it settled on the exclusion of “freeholders” who “who claim title to real property by virtue of their ownership rights in a limited partnership, a corporation, or other fictitious name association, or in special circumstances, where an organization is formed for the apparent or express purpose of taking title to property principally to acquire the right to vote, or a person or persons who claim title to less than 50 percent of the real property which is owned jointly with a corporation, limited partnership, or fictitious name organization.”[15] How the town council was to discern the “apparent or express” purpose of a corporation was not specified.


Sidebar: Sussex Sands, Inc., the corporation that owned the Sands Motel and in which Cartwright and several town councilmen owned minority shares, remains a going concern. John Caldwell, the owner and operator of the motel (and failed town council candidate himself) died in 1982, but his widow remains listed as the registered agent for the corporation, at the motel's original address (a comparison of a 2012 Google Street View image and a 1979 postcard featuring the motel reveal the property to be the same). In 2020 the motel was remodeled and renamed, and is now branded as an upscale Hilton property, “Fenwick Shores.”[16]

The latest major change with regard to corporate voting in Fenwick Island was made by amendment in 2008. In a sweeping revision of the charter’s voter qualification section, the amendment inserted a by-then increasingly common (in Delaware) “one-person/entity, one vote,” provision, limiting both natural persons and artificial entities to one vote, total, no matter how many parcels of property they owned. It also specified more clearly the documentation needed for corporations (a notarized power of attorney designating a proxy voter; corporations still need humans to take action). 

In keeping with twenty-first century Delawarean practice, the provision of corporate voting went unremarked in public discussions of the  amendment process. The town manager, Anthony Carson, justified the revision only in terms of needing to increase the town’s “outdated” credit limit, raise funds sufficient to build a new “public safety building.” At least in news reports, the “one person/entity” rule – or corporate voting, more generally – did not warrant a mention. [17] A 2018 charter amendment increased the burden on human voters  – requiring more identification to establish residency – but left procedures for corporate voters unchanged. [18]

~~~

Human democracy – government for the people, by the people – has never taken firm root in the sandy soils of Fenwick Island. A land imagined speculatively from its first legal organization, property has always called the shots there. Controversy over governing power, when it has occurred, has been over how much control a given person (natural or legally fictitious) has over real estate title – not whether people matter more than property. 

Fenwick Island, then, mirrors in some ways Delaware’s increasingly unambiguous preference for corporate controllers over community stakeholders. Whether it’s taxes at the beach, or plaintiffs at the bar, the state’s governing institutions seem to incline to consolidated power over any other available option. It remains to be seen how this system will weather the strong storms we know are coming.

—–

Header Image Source: Sands Beach Resort Motel, 1979, Postcard, 21 x 9 cm, Special Collections, University of Delaware Library, GRA 0138, Delaware Postcard Collection, https://digitalcollections.udel.edu/Documents/Detail/sands-beach-resort-motel/164590.

[1] Corporations and other artificial entities, including “partnerships, trusts, and limited liability companies” – provided they are domiciled in the state, and own property in the town. Charter of Fenwick Island, Sec. 9(A)(2), State of Delaware, accessed January 20, 2026, https://charters.delaware.gov/fenwickisland.shtml&nbsp;

[2] 76 Del. Laws, c. 363 (2008)

[3] Charter of Fenwick Island, Sec. 6 and Sec. 9, State of Delaware, accessed January 20, 2026, https://charters.delaware.gov/fenwickisland.shtml&nbsp;

[4] ACLU-DE Files Lawsuit Against Fenwick Island for Allowing Corporations to Vote in Local Elections, (ACLU Delaware), December 3, 2025, https://www.aclu-de.org/press-releases/fenwick-corporate-voting/ ; Jacob Owens, “ACLU Sues Fenwick Island over Non-Resident Voting,” Spotlight Delaware, December 5, 2025, https://spotlightdelaware.org/2025/12/05/aclu-sues-fenwick-island-over-non-resident-voting/. (NB that the Spotlight article significantly misstates the core contention of the ACLU’s suit: the organization is contesting Fenwick’s practice of non-human voting – not non-resident voting).

[5] Kerin Magill, “Fenwick Island Responds to ACLU Lawsuit,” Coastal Point, December 12, 2025, https://www.coastalpoint.com/news/communities/fenwickisland/fenwick-island-responds-to-aclu-lawsuit/article_0ff740be-481b-43c5-8271-6c2faaae1899.html.

[6] The newspaper reporting on Layton’s purchase is somewhat contradictory, but it appears he gained title to the island by buying out two members of the Gum family, Dr. F. M. Gum and William A. Gum, for a total of $6,750, in separate transactions. Layton’s purchase was covered in an amused tone by otherwise bored legislative reporters, who noted his enthusiasm for the property and its possibilities for duck hunting and sheep herding . “Bought Fenwick Island,” Morning News, April 10, 1893, p. 4; “Legislative notes,”Every Evening, April 18, 1893, p.1; “They Own the Whole Island,” Evening Journal, April 28, 1893, p.5;  “Clerk Layton’s Purchase,” Every Evening, April 28, 1893, p.1. 

There were earlier Delaware corporations with “Fenwick Island” in their names, but these appear to have been aimed at improving water infrastructure – ditch digging. See 14 Del. Laws, c. 149 (1871), “An Act to Incorporate the Fenwick’s Island Improvement Company,” March 15, 1871, pp. 217-220; 18 Del. Laws, c. 375 (1887), “An Act to Incorporate the Fenwick’s Island Beach Company,” April 14, 1887.

[7] “A Fenwick’s Island Boom,” Every Evening, April 19, 1893, p.2; 

 19 Del. Laws, c. 982 (1893), “An Act to incorporate the Fenwick Island Gunning Club,” April 24, 1893; 19 Del. Laws, c. 722 (1893), “An Act to incorporate the Fenwick Island Company,” April 25, 1893 pp. 972- 975. (On shareholder rights, see 19 Del. Laws, c. 722 (1893), p. 973-74.)

[8] “Fenwick Island Camp,”Every Evening, April 25, 1921, p.6; “State Offers Vactionists Rest,”Newark Post, July 26, 1922,p.2 ; “Delaware Vacation Spots Attract Pleasure Seekers,”Morning News, Feb. 27, 1937, p.27 

[9] “Ask Right to Buy Land,”Morning News, June 16, 1938, p.20; “Fenwick Island Land Sale Ready,” Morning News, January 5, 1942, p.18;  “Delaware to Sell Fenwick Island Land: Owners of Cottages Get Right to Buy Lots on Ocean Front,”Daily Times (Salisbury, MD), Jan. 5, 1942, p.8 

[10] “Other New Bills,” The Morning News, March 27, 1953, p.10; “Other Bills Passed,” Morning News, July 2, 1953, 40; 49 Del. Laws, c. 302 (1953), “An Act to Incorporate the Town of Fenwick Island, Delaware,” July 8, 1953, pp. 602-23 (on voter qualifications, see p.606, on taxes, p. 612).

In 1962, a Washington DC paper reporting on Fenwick’s amenities for vacationers – including a beach that coughed up silver dollars – noted that “the council is elected by everyone registered on the property tax rolls.” See: Janet Koltun, “Money Banks Deposits Dwindle but Fun Rises,” Evening Star (Washington, DC), Aug. 5, 1962, C-6

[11] 55 Del. Laws, c. 89 (1965), “An Act to Amend Chapter 302 … ‘ An Act to Incorporate the Town of Fenwick Island, Delaware’ By Authorizing the Borrowing of Money and Issuing Bonds Therefore…,” (May 27, 1965), pp. 360-62.

[12] 62 Del. Laws, c. 3 (1979), “An act to amend chapter 302…,” February 6, 1979, p.4

[13] Ed Shur, “Arrests May Be Illegal,”Daily Times (Salisbury, MD), July 14, 1981; Grayson Smith, “Fenwick Election Imperiled,”Morning News, July 14, 1981, p. C2 

[14] “Two Candidates run into flap in Fenwick election,”Morning News, July 31, 1981, p.C4; “Election Settles Issue in Fenwick,”Morning News, Aug 2, 1981, p.B2 

[15] 65 Del. Laws, c. 321 (1986), p. 603. Prior amendments include: 64 Del. Laws, c. 53 (1983). p. 110 and 63 Del. Laws, c. 371 (1982), p.775.

[16] Sussex Sands, Inc., file no. 858088, Entity Search Database, Delaware Division of Corporations, https://icis.corp.delaware.gov/Ecorp/EntitySearch/NameSearch.aspxSands Beach Resort Motel, 1979, Postcard, 21 x 9 cm, Special Collections, University of Delaware Library, GRA 0138, Delaware Postcard Collection; “J.R. Caldwell, Sands Motel owner, dies,” Morning News, Feb. 2, 1982, C4; 

[17] 76 Del. Laws, c. 363 (2008) ; Andrew Ostroski, “Fenwick Island Officials Meet to Change Charter,”Daily Times, July 25, 2008, B4. 

[18] 81 Del. Laws, c. 258 (2018).

Delaware

DGCL Fiasco 2025: Sources

Or, A Bibliography of News, Opinion, and Sources Relating to the 2025 Attempt to Revise Delaware’s General Corporation Law. Final update: 3/26/25.

A printed image of a long receding hallway in a grecian temple, with timelines and chronologies forming the wall, floors, and ceilings. Emma Willard, “The Temple of Time” (1846), via Cartography Associates (CC BY-NC-SA 3.0) https://www.davidrumsey.com/luna/servlet/detail/RUMSEY~8~1~315043~90083688:The-Temple-of-Time#
Emma Willard, “The Temple of Time” (1846), via Cartography Associates (CC BY-NC-SA 3.0)

Note: SB 21 (repackaged as SS 1 for SB 21) passed the Delaware House late on Tuesday, March 25, 2025 and was signed into law the same night by Governor Meyer. The bibliography below is updated to include reports through the following day – March 26, 2025 – but nothing beyond that point.

Since it was dropped on an unsuspecting public two weeks ago, Senate Bill 21 has occasioned a great deal of both propaganda and conversation – and even some reporting and evidence-based analysis. This short bibliography (or, less pretentiously, link-roundup) is intended to help Delawareans and other folks get up to speed on the issue, understand the forces in play, and get a sense of the stakes. 

I will update it, as my time allows, and events merit. I have tried to (mostly) link publicly accessible sources, but there may be some paywalled exceptions. 

Some caveats: the bibliography below is not comprehensive, nor is it intended to be. It’s what, in my judgment, is the most useful for understanding what the hell is going on.

Also! It is not a guide to the bloggy conversations among corporate law specialists, a play-by-play for Dover courtiers’ inside baseball, or the group chat among oligarchics’ agents – though it intersects with all of those discourses. (Go to LinkedIn, Facebook, and Signal, respectively, if you want those.)  

Get Up To Speed

Xerxes Wilson, “Controversial Corporate Law Changes Passed by House, Signed by Delaware Governor,” The News Journal, March 26, 2025, https://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/2025/03/25/delaware-corporate-law-changes-chancery-court-signed-into-law-by-governor-matt-meyer/82655315007/;

Karl Baker and Jacob Owens, “Meyer Signs Controversial Senate Bill 21 into Law after Bitter House Debate,” Spotlight Delaware, March 26, 2025, http://spotlightdelaware.org/2025/03/26/meyer-signs-senate-bill-21/.

Lora Kolodny, “Meta’s Potential Exit from Delaware Had Governor Worried Enough to Call Special Weekend Meetings,” CNBC, March 19, 2025, https://www.cnbc.com/2025/03/19/meta-billions-of-dollars-at-stake-in-overhaul-delaware-corporate-law.html.

Lora Kolodny, “Tesla’s Law Firm Drafts Delaware Bill That Could Salvage Musk Pay Package,” CNBC, February 18, 2025, https://www.cnbc.com/2025/02/18/firm-representing-musk-tesla-drafts-bill-for-delaware-corporate-law.html.

Jordan Howell, “DelDems Roll over for Musk,” Delaware Call, February 17, 2025, https://delawarecall.com/2025/02/17/deldems-roll-over-for-musk/.

Primary Source(s)

Senate Substitute 1 for Senate Bill 21: “AN ACT TO AMEND TITLE 8 OF THE DELAWARE CODE RELATING TO THE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW,” filed March 12, 2025, passed March 25, 2025, https://legis.delaware.gov/BillDetail/141930

  • Primary sponsor: Sen. Townsend
  • Cosponsors: Sen. Sokola, Lockman, Hocker, Pettyjohn; Reps. Griffith, Minor-Brown, Harris, Osienski, Dukes, Spiegelman

House Amendment 1 to Senate Substitute 1 for Senate Bill 21, filed March 18, 2025, [proposed amendment, not picked up] https://legis.delaware.gov/BillDetail?LegislationId=141964

  • Sponsor: Rep. S. Phillips
  • Summary: “This Amendment mirrors the proposed changes in SS 1 for Senate Bill 21, but provides that the corporation must “opt-in” to adopt them. It adds a new section one, which describes the method by which the corporation may opt in to the changes from the default, existing law.”

Senate Bill 21: “AN ACT TO AMEND TITLE 8 OF THE DELAWARE CODE RELATING TO THE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW,” filed February 17, 2025, https://legis.delaware.gov/BillDetail/141857 [original bill]

  • Primary sponsor: Sen. Townsend
  • Cosponsors: Sen. Sokola, Lockman, Hocker, Pettyjohn; Reps. Griffith, Minor-Brown, Harris, Osienski, Dukes, Spiegelman

Senate Concurrent Resolution 17, https://legis.delaware.gov/BillDetail/141858

  • Primary sponsor: Sen. Townsend
  • Cosponsors: Sen. Sokola, Lockman, Hocker, Pettyjohn; Reps. Griffith, Minor-Brown, Harris, Osienski, Dukes, Spiegelman

Delaware General Corporation Law, Delaware Code, Title 8, https://delcode.delaware.gov/title8/c001/

Office of the Governor, “Discussion Re: Corporate Franchise,” February 2025, https://www.scribd.com/document/840790103/CNBC-copy-2025-03-12-de-Governor-FOIA-Response-38#download&from_embed.

  • Internal emails between personnel in Gov. Matt Meyer’s office and various Musk & Zuckerberg associated lawyers, coordinating drafts, details, & messaging around the push for SB 21;

Dig Deeper

The items below represent a wide spectrum of debate on SB21 and the political economy of Delaware’s corporate law; inclusion is not an endorsement that a given piece is reliable, truthful, or accurate – simply influential. This list is organized chronologically, working backwards from most recent.

Xerxes Wilson, “Controversial Corporate Law Changes Passed by House, Signed by Delaware Governor,” The News Journal, March 26, 2025, https://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/2025/03/25/delaware-corporate-law-changes-chancery-court-signed-into-law-by-governor-matt-meyer/82655315007/;

Karl Baker and Jacob Owens, “Meyer Signs Controversial Senate Bill 21 into Law after Bitter House Debate,” Spotlight Delaware, March 26, 2025, http://spotlightdelaware.org/2025/03/26/meyer-signs-senate-bill-21/.

Karl Baker, “Lobbying on Corporate Law Change SB21 Enters Final Stretch,” Spotlight Delaware, March 21, 2025, http://spotlightdelaware.org/2025/03/21/sb21-final-stretch/.

Katie Tabeling, “Top Delaware Firm Takes Quiet Role in Corporate Amendment Debate,” Delaware Business Times, March 20, 2025, https://delawarebusinesstimes.com/news/firm-quiet-role-in-corporate-amendment/.

Lora Kolodny, “Meta’s Potential Exit from Delaware Had Governor Worried Enough to Call Special Weekend Meetings,” CNBC, March 19, 2025, https://www.cnbc.com/2025/03/19/meta-billions-of-dollars-at-stake-in-overhaul-delaware-corporate-law.html.

Yvonne Deadwyler, “Preserving the Corporate Franchise Is in the Interest of All,” Delaware Business Times, March 18, 2025, https://delawarebusinesstimes.com/news/viewpoint-sb-21-deadwyler/

Katie Tabeling, “Meet the Business Organizations Endorsing SB 21,” Delaware Business Times, March 17, 2025, https://delawarebusinesstimes.com/news/business-endorsing-sb-21/

Joel Friedlander, “Are Hamermesh, Chandler and Strine Making Delaware Corporate Law Great Again?,” The News Journal, March 17, 2025, https://www.delawareonline.com/story/opinion/2025/03/17/are-hamermesh-chandler-and-strine-making-delaware-corporate-law-great-again-opinion/82490918007/.

Joseph R. Mason, “SB 21 Could Cost Delaware Millions,” Delaware Business Times, March 17, 2025, https://delawarebusinesstimes.com/news/viewpoint-sb21-could-cost-millions/

Matthew G. Jacobs, General Counsel, CalPERS to Senator Bryan Townsend, et al, Re: “Delaware Senate Bill No. 21,” March 14, 2025, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/25590146/letter-from-calpers-to-delaware-leadership.pdf.

Katie Tabeling, “How a New Bill Raises Uncertainty in Wilmington’s Legal Economy,” Delaware Business Times, March 14, 2025, https://delawarebusinesstimes.com/news/sb-21-legal-economy/.

Karl Stomberg, “Capital Fight or Flight: Delaware’s History of Gangster Capitalism and the Need for a Democratic Economy,” Delaware Call, March 13, 2025, https://delawarecall.com/2025/03/13/capital-fight-or-flight/.

Greg Vallaro, “Delaware Senate Bill 21 Is a Disaster. It’s Time to Call Strike Three,” News Journal, March 12, 2025, https://www.delawareonline.com/story/opinion/2025/03/12/delaware-senate-bill-21-is-a-disaster-opinion/82277898007/.

Jeffrey P. Mahoney, “SB 21 Threatens Long-Term Shareholder Rights,” Delaware Business Times, March 10, 2025, https://delawarebusinesstimes.com/news/viewpoint-sb-21-shareholder-rights/.

Alan Jagolinzer et al., “The False Crisis Pushing Delaware to Surrender Shareholder Rights,” ProMarket, March 7, 2025, https://www.promarket.org/2025/03/07/the-false-crisis-pushing-delaware-to-surrender-shareholder-rights/.

William Chandler and Lawrence Hamermesh, “Delaware’s Corporate Law, Proposed Amendments Play Fair,” Delaware Business Times, March 6, 2025, https://delawarebusinesstimes.com/news/viewpoint-sb21-chandler-hamermesh/.

June Carbone, Nancy Levit, and Naomi Cahn, “Elon Musk and the Rise of the Dictator CEO,” Washington Monthly, March 6, 2025, http://washingtonmonthly.com/2025/03/06/elon-musk-and-the-rise-of-the-dictator-ceo/.

Cris Barrish, “Is ‘DExit’ a Real Threat to Delaware’s $2B-a-Year Incorporation Kingdom, and Will the Proposal Protect or Destroy ‘the Franchise’?,” WHYY, March 5, 2025, https://whyy.org/articles/dexit-delaware-franchise-incorporation-industry-billionaires-bill/

“Legal Experts Weigh in on Townsend’s Remarks in Delaware Call Interview,” Delaware Call, March 4, 2025, https://delawarecall.com/2025/03/04/legal-experts-weigh-in-on-townsends-remarks-in-delaware-call-interview/

Daniel Taylor, “Delaware’s Manufactured Corporate Crisis,” Delaware Business Times (blog), March 4, 2025, https://delawarebusinesstimes.com/news/viewpoint-taylor-sb-21/.

Chris Foulds, “Billionaire Corporate Law Smash-and-Grab Could Destroy Delaware’s Economy,” News Journal, March 3, 2025, https://www.delawareonline.com/story/opinion/2025/03/03/billionaire-corporate-law-smash-and-grab-could-destroy-delawares-economy-opinion/80549853007/.

Andrew Verstein, “The Corporate Census,” SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, February 25, 2025), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=5154952

  • NB this item is a working paper – meaning, it is an unpublished draft, that has not undergone peer review. All arguments should be understood as preliminary, and incomplete.

Ann Lipton, “Rip American Shareholder Capitalism,” Financial Times, February 24, 2025, sec. FT Alphaville, https://www.ft.com/content/85eccee4-3890-4c25-bd89-eb522b95efb9

Lawrence Cunningham, “Delaware Aptly Balances Certainty and Scrutiny in Corporate Law,” Bloomberg Law, February 24, 2025, https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/delaware-aptly-balances-certainty-and-scrutiny-in-corporate-law.

Dael Norwood, “The Data Does Not Support the Narrative,” Goose Commerce (blog), February 23, 2025, https://daelnorwood.com/2025/02/23/the-data-does-not-support-the-narrative/.

Jordan Howell, “Delaware Call Interviews Sen. Bryan Townsend About SB21,” Delaware Call, February 21, 2025, https://delawarecall.com/2025/02/21/delaware-call-interviews-sen-bryan-townsend-about-sb21/.

Ryan Cooper, “Why Are Delaware Democrats Trying to Give Elon Musk $55 Billion?,” The American Prospect, February 21, 2025, https://prospect.org/api/content/63bddae0-efd3-11ef-9411-12163087a831/.

Jacob Owens, “Chief Justice Seitz Warns Lawmakers against Reducing Courts’ Independence – Spotlight Delaware,” Spotlight Delaware, February 21, 2025, https://spotlightdelaware.org/2025/02/21/chief-justice-warns-lawmakers-against-reducing-courts-independence

Peter Walker, “Is Delaware Losing Startup Incorporations to Other States? … (No),” LinkedIn (blog), February 21, 2025, https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7298753740558254080/.

Delaware Working Families Party (DE-WFP), Stop Elon Musk’s Corporate Law Bill, https://actionnetwork.org/letters/stop-elon-musks-corporate-law-bill

Public Citizen, Americans for Financial Reform, American Association for Justice, Consumer Federation of America,  STOP DELAWARE SENATE BILL 21https://www.stopsb21.com

Andrew Blumberg, Ben Potts, and Tom James, “Delaware Corporate Law Myth-Busting: The ‘Expanding Definition’ of Controlling Stockholder,” The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance (blog), February 21, 2025, https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2025/02/21/delaware-corporate-law-myth-busting-the-expanding-definition-of-controlling-stockholder/.

Jennifer Kay and Jef Feeley, “Musk’s War on Delaware Spurs State Bill to Hang On to Businesses,” Bloomberg.Com, February 19, 2025, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-02-19/musk-s-war-on-delaware-spurs-state-bill-to-hang-on-to-businesses.

Collin Woodard, “Musk’s New Plan To Get His $56 Billion: Change The Law,” Jalopnik (blog), February 19, 2025, https://www.jalopnik.com/1794019/musks-new-plan-to-get-his-56-billion-change-the-law/.

Dael Norwood, “The Golden Goose Is An Arsonist,” Delaware Business Times, February 19, 2025, https://delawarebusinesstimes.com/news/viewpoints/viewpoint-the-golden-goose-is-an-arsonist/.

Karl Baker and Jacob Owens, “Landmark Delaware Corporate Law Changes Aim to Stem Exits,” Spotlight Delaware, February 19, 2025, http://spotlightdelaware.org/2025/02/19/delaware-corporate-law-change-sb-21/.

Ann Lipton, “Delaware Decides Delaware Law Has No Value,” Business Law Prof Blog (blog), February 18, 2025, https://www.businesslawprofessors.com/2025/02/delaware-decides-delaware-law-has-no-value/.

Jacob Owens, “Meyer Considers Corporate Court Reform, Drawing Concern,” Spotlight Delaware, February 11, 2025, http://spotlightdelaware.org/2025/02/11/meyer-chancery-court-reform/.

Ann Lipton, “Delaware Decides Delaware Law Has No Value,” Business Law Prof Blog (blog), February 18, 2025, https://www.businesslawprofessors.com/2025/02/delaware-decides-delaware-law-has-no-value/.

Our Glorious National Heritage, Power At Play, Uncategorized

This Slave Trade of the … 21st Century?

Or, Horrible Things Briefly Noted

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Clipper_Ship_Southern_Cross_Leaving_Boston_Harbor_1851.jpeg

A specter is haunting today’s localized edition of the International Herald Tribune – the specter of nineteenth-century labor. In the appropriately (but I’m convinced utterly un-irionically) titled “Modern slavery: How bad is bonded labour,” a modern day Swift-sans-satire offers his readers a new modest proposal : why not re-legalize bonded labor?

The benefits, he says, are obvious: “[a] loyal workforce is more cost-effective” than one comprised of “floating and opportunistic workers who follow the bucks and switch frequently in pursuit of better pecuniary benefits and career progression.” Besides, the “economist” with “a PhD from Cambridge University” notes, Pakistan’s laws prohibiting slavery are ill-enforced; better instead and do away any prohibition, and replace it with a regime whereby owners – sorry, employers – are proded to take care of workers and their families “in terms of shelter and health.” Better for everyone! And certainly more profitable.

I snark, but these arguments should sound familiar to any student of proslavery rhetoric – although they were attacked as the utterly immoral statements they are by slaveholders in the past.

~

For some years now, the IHT has been owned by The New York Times. Founded as a conservative pro-business paper in 1851, just as the sectional conflict over legal chattel slavery was really starting to heat up in the United States, the NYT not infrequently weighed in on the subject of slavery, generally advocating a quiet and peaceful end to the institution, but with as little fuss and cost as possible. To that end, in the early 1850s the editors of the Times supported the introduction of a special kind of bonded labor into the United States: so-called “coolie” labor.

“Coolies” were workers from Asia (usually China or British India) who contracted to work eight-year stints in the Americas. They were hired most often to replace slave laborers on tropical plantations. (NB: the term “coolie,” now a highly derogatory racial slur, was seen by writers at the Times primarily as a legal category of workers from Asia – though that makes it no less a symbol of the virulent white supremacy that formed the foundation for the politics of the period). Asian laborers were needed on these plantations because slaves were becoming scarce, either as a result of legal emancipation (as in the British Caribbean) or indirectly as a result of the enforcement of transatlantic slave trade bans. This was in contrast to the American South, where slave populations were growing, and highly mobile. The editors at the Times promoted the traffic in Asian workers’ labor as a anti-slavery solution to slavery – which was conceived as as a problem of political economy, not morality. And they wielded that advocacy as a weapon in smaller political conflicts.

Responding in 1852 to Southern slaveholders’s agitation in 1852 agitate New York Times took up the subject from the perspective of economics, articulating what had become the conventional wisdom among Northerners on the topic. Noting that in Cuba the “experiment” in Chinese labor “has proved successful,” the Times wondered if Cuba’s labor system would not be “coveted by the Planter in the neighboring American States?” A few weeks later, the editors went further, suggesting that “the real malady of the South is defective labor, and the remedy the same as that now employed in Cuba – the introduction of the Chinese Coolies.” Should contracted Chinese coolie labor be successful, the Times editors thought, “the peculiar institution will at once give way to imitation; and so will end the great economical pestilence of the South.” The Times and its readers among the bourgeois elite indentured Chinese labor was a panacea for the economic and political ills of slavery, and, notably, a system that would benefit their style of investment and management handsomely.1 (The Times was not alone in this admiration for “coolie” labor, of course).

~

The system was acceptable to the Times in 1850 and their foolish successor at the IHT because it is founded – in theory – in the sine qua non of the liberal market economy: the freedom and sanctity of contracts. In this case, that means the freedom of a worker to sign away control over their body for a limited amount of time.  In practice, all evidence is on the side of the “freedom” here being no more than a myth, a viscious fantasy.

Ironically, in the United States, evidence of the evils of  indentured (or “bonded”) Asian labor were brought to light by slaveholders. Fearing that “free” indentured Asian labor would cut into their profits and political power, slaveholders across the United States in the mid-1850s began using reports of forced contracts, cruel ship conditions, and on-plantation mistreatment to argue, loudly, that the system was too cruel and too exploitative to be allowed to continue. They were acting in their own interests, of course, and their counterargument that their slaves were better treated was clearly a lie; but they were quite successful in getting other parties in the U.S., including the NYT, to abandon the trade as a proposal (at least for a time). By 1859, the “coolie trade” was described by one popular commercial encyclopedia as a subsection of the slave trade:

This trade has sprung up since vigorous efforts have been made to suppress the slave-trade proper. Although theoretically the coolie trade promised benefits to both planters and coolie, yet practically it is only another form of the slave-trade.

~J. Smith Homans, ed., A Cyclopedia of Commerce and Commercial Navigation (Harper & Brothers, 1859), II:1728-9

This sentiment carried into the Civil War; in 1862, a fervent abolitionist named Thomas Dawes Eliot pushed a bill banning American participation in the trade of “Chinese cooleys” through Congress – but that’s another story, and its own set of (no less dark) problems.

~

To return to the main point: whatever you call it, bonded labor is bondage. It’s slavery. That was true in 1859, and it’s true now, whatever ahistorical argument a Cambridge Econ PhD makes.2 But for a better approach to the problem of poverty and slavery in the contemporary world, one that’s actually historically informed, why don’t you take a look at what the Historians Against Slavery have been up to?

That should help rinse out some of the bitter taste, at least.


h/t @karpmj to for passing the IHT article along

1.) The Times was prolific on the topic for a time. See: “Orientals in America,” New York Times, 15 April 1852; “Cotton, Cane and the Coolies,” ibid., 3 May 1852; “Labor in Cuba,” ibid., 10 December 1852 for relevant examples.

2.) The headnote in the IHT, in attempting to frame the piece as a courageous anti-politically correct piece, really only demonstrates the author’s ignorance of historiography by claiming to be “following the academic tradition set by Robert William Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman in their fiercely debated book ‘Time on the Cross: The Economics of American Negro Slavery’ (1974).”