Category: Archival Follies

Archival Follies, Dismal Scientists

Extra, Extra! Territoriality

daelnorwood

Or, History: Slaughter Bench or Treasure Chest?

extra

Over at Marginal Revolution the other day, Tyler Cowen opened a discussion about extraterritoriality as a way to promote economic growth, part of a longer-running conversation about the viability / desirability / possibility of setting up what Paul Romer calls “Charter Cities,” which as far as I can tell are colonies-by-permission.

As Prof. Cowen references some historical works on the concept, I presume he — and his commenters — are at least passing familiar with the way violence was needed to originate and maintain extraterritorial rights, at least over the last two centuries. However, their discussion, as with most of this kind of neo-liberal thought experiment, appears to have no real sense of how power — its mechanics, its actual use, it as a motivating factor — maps on to all of this.

Rather kills the fun, I think.

In that context, I think this excerpt from a letter by an American diplomat in Shanghai — that experiment par excellence in modern extraterritoriality — might serve as a useful correction to the discussion. This is what extraterritoriality meant the first time it was used in earnest: creeping (or running!) imperialism.

It seems that the Imperial troops attempted to intercept cannon which they understood a British House was designing to deliver to the Insurgents, and for this purpose entered the foreign settlement. They were met by foreigners and were driven out of the settlement, with a loss of six of their number, who were shot in the conflict. The Chinese fired also, but did no material damage. There were no citizens of the United States involved in the affair. Commodore Perry has not communicated to me any details of the report of Commander Walker, and I must therefore confine my own statement to the repetition of the brief report of the occurrence as it is mentioned in a private letter from Mr. Cunningham, the vice-consul of the United States.

This affair is a legitimate result from the prior conduct of foreigners generally at Shanghai, and of the British authorities and residents in particular. The Chinese, either Rebels or Imperialists, are unable to protect themselves against European arms; and a knowledge of this fact seems to render foreigners perfectly careless of the extent to which they trespass on their rights. For my stern opposition to all violations of neutrality and my warning that its consequences must be and ought to be the generation of national hostility, I have become quite a mark for scribblers through the British Press in China and, I presume, of animadversion at home. I rely for my vindication upon the determination of my Government to sustain a public servant in the firm discharge of public duty.

In any other country than China men would be arrested and immediately executed for a great many offenses which have been committed here with impunity, and apparently with the sanction of the foreign public authority. I enclose a printed slip containing a remonstrance addressed to the British Consul at Shanghai to his countrymen, which admits a conclusive case against them, yet, it is said, he demanded an explanation of this affair from the Chinese Imperial General, and received some sort of apology for the resistance of the Chinese troops! It must be plain that the Chinese will entertain resentment for such conduct although at present they may be unable to exhibit it. This occurrence has been the apology for strengthening the British guard at Shanghai; and, the foreign quarter of that city may already be said to be, in effect, under British rule. A correspondent of mine writing from that city under date of November 30 says

“The fact is, the authorities of Great Britain are exercising here in Shanghai all the rights and prerogatives of sovereignty, as between themselves and the Chinese. They have actually garrisoned the place on their own hook, refusing to regard it as a mixed and common cause of all foreigners. If the crews of the Spartan and Salamander are not sufficient, of course a Regiment of Ceylon Rifles or British Infantry would be put in requisition. What more could sovereignty do?”

~Humphrey Marshall, U.S. Commissioner to China, to the Secretary of State, 8 December 1853

But hey, maybe if we had a Western power – governed by an ideology of a liberal economics bent, naturally – administer a major city in some poor country’s territory everything would be cool? It might work out this time.

Unlike all the other times…

Image cite: Leekelleher, “extra,” Flickr CC License

Archival Follies, Now in Actual Work

Wheatonesque

daelnorwood

Or, Nineteenth-Century Natural History and Geopolitics Go Together Like…*

Frame

Henry Wheaton was a busy man in 1843. Aside from his official duties as U.S. Minister to Prussia – which included everything from issuing passports and entertaining visiting Americans to more serious affairs like preparing for a treaty negotiations with the Zolleverein, the German Customs Union – he was also intensely engaged in writing reports, as a hobby.

And not just a few. In 1843, Wheaton wrote at least ten reports for the National Institution for the Promotion of Science – aka the “National Institute” – a Washington-based organization that sought to : “to promote Science and the Useful Arts, and to establish a National Museum of Natural History, &c. &c.”

Wheaton’s contributions to the Institute fell firmly in the “&c. &c.” category. Though best known for his legal work – he was the first professional reporter for the Supreme Court, and wrote the standard treatises on international and maritime law – his reports for the National Institute trace a wider circle, and depart significantly from the then-standard definitions of “scientific and useful arts.” He wrote absolutely no treatises on New England ferns or Great Lake mollusks (all popular topics with the Washington professionals cum amateur scientists that made up the bulk of the Institute’s membership), which probably accounts for his failure to get the Institute to help publish his work.

Instead, he wrote on a bewildering array of subjects, including:

The geography of Central Asia; the revival of Greek tragedy in Prussia; German canals; the state of the fine arts in Denmark ; the character of Frederick the Great; the last days of the Emperor Charles V; the genius and labors of Liebniz; the life and writings of Diderot; the Panama canal; the history of the reformation in Germany; Egyptian Antiquities, and the Ptolemaic canal across the Isthmus of Suez.

If we ignore the Teutonic flavor of some of the reports (likely the result of his location and occupation; he had been a diplomat in Prussia since 1835), a striking pattern emerges. Almost uniquely among the corresponding members of the National Institute, Wheaton was concerned with history, culture, art – and, above all commerce and geopolitics.
Continue reading “Wheatonesque” →

Archival Follies, The Past is a Foreign...Something

Great Moments in Taking Things Completely Out of Context

daelnorwood

Diplomatic Despatches* Edition

Giraffe

“Feeling excited by the Death of the Duke of Orleans.”

~Edward Everett, U.S. Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Great Britain, to Daniel Webster, Secretary of State, 18 July 1842, Despatch No. 17.

* Yes, they spelled it “despatches” not “dispatches.” No, I don’t know why.

Image cite: Swiv,”What?,” Flickr, CC License

Archival Follies

Experienced Inconvenience

daelnorwood

What with all the bodies piling up on the dock

LonelyDock

A strange mix of violence, confusion, and settled community reigned for the American residents (and presumably others) of coastal China in the mid-nineteenth century. The bureaucratic requirements of the State Department forced the unstable chaos of events into some odd, strained forms, at times.

See, for example, the following abstract of the resident American minister’s report for February 1850:

Grants of Land at Shang Hae [Shanghai] – Inconvenience experienced for want of a proper burial place for American citizens dying at Whampoa – Murder of two American citizens at the Fugee [Fiji] Islands by the natives – Sends his accounts – Death either of the mother of the Emperor of China, or the Emperor himself – Assault made upon the French Consul.

That’s a busy month, folks, but pretty typical of the time/place.

Image cite: Marcn, “Lonely Swimming Dock,” Flickr, CC License

Archival Follies, Our Glorious National Heritage

Ctrl+C, Ctrl+V, Can’t Control Me

daelnorwood

Or, Limited (Antebellum) Government in Action

William S. Wetmore

So: there I was, reading through the official “instructions” (orders) to Commodore Lawrence Kearny, commander of the East India Squadron, on how he was to engage with the Chinese authorities while on his mission to protect American commerce during the first opium war … when I ran across this:

Heretofore on the arrival of an American vessel in the waters of China, the Chinese authorities have always been given to understand by the American merchants, that the principal objects in view, were to visit desolate Islands for the purpose of rescuing shipwrecked mariners, & returning them to their native Country; to capture piratical vessels preying on their commerce; and to instruct their young men and boys to navigate vessels of war. – It might be well to keep up such impressions in the minds of the Chinese, as they are not incompatible with what you are to represent as you leading object, namely to prevent the smuggling of opium under cover of the American Flag, which your government has understood had been, or may be attempted by other nations.

~Sec. James K. Paulding to Com. Lawrence Kearney, Navy Department, 2 November 1840, Roll 32,
M149: Letters Sent by the Secretary of the Navy to Officers, 1798-1868 (Washington: NARA, 1950)

Huzzah what? Americans had convinced the Chinese that they were only sending warships up to Canton to teach kids how to sail and play rescue boats? And that was a ruse to continue in the name of better relations? Weird, right?

Now, Secretary James Kirke Paulding, though an imaginative fellow, and good enough with a pen, was not among the finest diplomats or naval strategists of his day. And was certainly no expert on China.* So then the question becomes: where on God’s green earth did he get such an idea?

A few days later, I found a far more direct answer than I expected, in a letter from a prominent China trader to Paulding. A few sections of its paragraphs were marked with large X’s, as if to highlight them ; the paragraph excerpted below had two such marks:

“Heretofore on the arrival of American vessels of War in the Chinese waters, the Chinese authorities have always been given [to] understand by the American Merchants that their object was to visit desolate Islands [to] rescue unfortunate shipwrecked seamen & to return them to their country & friends, and to capture piratical vessels, and also to give instruction to many young lads on board, and to learn them to navigate and manage vessels of War.”

~William S. Wetmore to J. K. Paulding (SecNav), New York, 22 July 1840, roll 174, M124: Miscellaneous Letters Received by the Secretary of Navy, 1801-1884 (Washington: NARA, 1960)

Aha.

Gotta love cut and paste governance.

I don’t know for sure if what Wetmore says is true, but I strongly suspect that the probability of the U.S. mercantile community at Canton maintaining a stable set of lies for nearly 60 years is quite low — so at best this particular bundle of nonsense was only laid on the Chinese once or twice.

Though to be fair to Paulding, this kind of drafting of orders appears to have been (or have become) normal procedure. A few years later, when preparing for Caleb Cushing’s mission to China, then-Secretary of State Daniel Webster sent out a form letter to American merchants active in the trade asking for information and advice:

Sir:

You will have learned that, under the authority of an act of Congress, a public mission is about to proceed from the United States to China, for the purpose of cultivating friendly relations with that Empire, and of opening and enlarging, as far as practicable, commercial intercourse between the two countries.

For its own information, and the use of the mission, the Government desires to avail itself of opinions and suggestions of intelligent persons, who have had personal acquaintance with that country, or have been concerned extensively in the trade between it and the United States.

The general objects of the mission sufficiently indicate the points to which these suggestions may refer.
Any communication from you upon the subject would be gratefully received by this Department.

~Daniel Webster, Circular, Department of State Washington, March 20, 1843, roll 101, M179:Miscellaneous Letters of the Department of State, 1789-1906 (Washington, DC: NARA, 1963)

Basically, this is step one of a process analogous to that which led Paulding to use Wetmore’s advice verbatim.**

Say what you will in favor of limited government, but it has its drawbacks: namely, when the time comes, your bureaucracy knows absolute squat about anything, and you have to depend on the kindness of strangers to help you sail (literally, in this case) the ship of state.

*Yes, that is his actual name. No, he was not awesome enough to have it — though he did have a certain way with words, even when he was wrong wrong wrong.

For example, here’s JKP on feeling pressure to build steam ships for the Navy: ” After asking how anyone could ‘consent to let our old ships perish, and transform our navy into a fleet of sea monsters,’ James Paulding gasped: ‘I am being steamed to death!'” Stephen Howarth, To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navy, 1775 – 1998 (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), p. 141

**The situation was even a bit sadder than that, because Webster — despite all his contacts / backing from Northeastern merchants — also did not know which ports dealt in the trade, and which had to first find out who the major China traders were. A few days before he sent out the form letter, he asked the each of the customs collectors of the major East Coast ports to compile a list of merchants “interested” in the China trade; this list appears to have served as a basis for soliciting further advice.